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“It	  is	  true	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  predicated	  on	  the	  equality	  of	  
all	   human	   beings,	   while	   the	   imperative	   of	   comparative	  
advantage	  in	  trade	  inevitably	  creates	  winners	  and	  losers.	  And	  
it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  human	  rights	  priorities	  lie	  in	  the	  protection	  
and	   empowerment	   of	   the	   vulnerable	   and	   the	   marginalized,	  
while	  success	  in	  trade	  rewards	  those	  who	  possess	  a	  competitive	  
edge	   in	  navigating	   the	  global	  markets.	  Further,	  human	  rights	  
law	   insists	   on	   State	   obligations,	   while	   the	   liberalization	   of	  
trade	   may	   make	   the	   role	   of	   States	   progressively	   shrink.	   I	  
maintain,	   however,	   that	   as	   engines	   of	   human	   well-­‐being,	  
progress	   and	   mutual	   understanding,	   the	   common	   and	  
potentially	   reciprocally	   reinforcing	   aspects	   of	   human	   rights	  
and	  trade	  far	  outweigh	  their	  contrasting	  features.”1	  	  
	  
	  –	  Navi	  Pillay,	  former	  UN	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Right
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “Pacific	  Trade	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Health”	  (Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program,	  2011),	  2.	  2	  Manuel	  Couret	  Branco	  and	  Pedro	  Damiao	  Henriques,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Human	  Right	  to	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1.	  INTRODUCTION	  	  	  The	  current	  approach	  to	  trade	  is	   intrinsically	  contradictory	  to	  the	  enhancement	  of	  human	   rights.	   Moreover,	   the	   approach	   not	   only	   competes	   with	   human	   rights	   but	  also	   imposes	   obstacles	   to	   achieving	   them.2	  Still	   others	   go	   further,	   asserting	   that	  human	  rights	  rhetoric	  is	  misused	  to	  legitimize	  the	  economic	  interests	  of	  global	  and	  domestic	   actors.3	  They	   point	   to	   an	   inherent	   contradiction:	   trade	   is	   commonly	  promoted	   as	   creating	   conditions	   conducive	   for	   protecting	   rights,	   while	  simultaneously	  leading	  to	  considerable	  violations	  of	  rights.4	  	  	   The	  recognition	  of	  trade’s	  adverse	  affects	  on	  human	  rights	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  framework	  for	  evaluating	  trade’s	  impact.5	  The	  age-­‐old	  discourse	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	   trade	   and	   labor	  has	   focused	  on	   assessing	  how	   trade’s	   influence	   on	   labor	  affects	  economic	  productivity.	  Criticisms	  of	  trade	  liberalization	  have	  begun	  to	  push	  the	   boundaries	   of	   this	   discussion,	   claiming	   that	   the	   affect	   of	   trade	   on	   labor	  standards	  should	  have	  a	  more	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  discourse	  on	  trade.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Manuel	  Couret	  Branco	  and	  Pedro	  Damiao	  Henriques,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Human	  Right	  to	  Water,”	  Review	  of	  Radical	  Political	  Economics	  42,	  no.	  2	  (June	  2010):	  3–4;	  Dommen,	  Caroline,	  “Raising	  Human	  Rights	  Concerns	  in	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization:	  Actors:	  Processes	  and	  Possible	  Strategies,”	  
Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  24,	  no.	  1	  (February	  1,	  2002):	  14.	  3	  Tony	  Evans,	  “Citizenship	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Globalization,”	  Sage	  Publications,	  Inc.	  25,	  no.	  4	  (2000):	  415–38.	  4	  Ibid.,	  418.	  5	  This	  paper	  discusses	  human	  rights	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  international	  human	  rights	  framework.	  The	  standards	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  binding	  commitments	  established	  in	  the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (UDHR)	  in	  1948.	  Together	  with	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights	  (ICCPR)	  and	  the	  International	  Covenant	  on	  Economic,	  Social	  and	  Cultural	  Rights	  (ICESCR),	  these	  documents	  make	  up	  the	  International	  Bill	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Workers	  rights	  are	  delineated	  in	  all	  three	  of	  the	  documents.	  Further,	  labor	  standards	  are	  defined	  by	  numerous	  conventions	  and	  recommendations	  passed	  by	  the	  International	  Labor	  Organization	  (ILO),	  an	  international	  organization	  mandated	  to	  protect	  workers	  rights.	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   While	  human	  rights	  organizations	  and	  some	  economists	  have	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  human	  rights	  to	  be	  analyzed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  trade,	  international	  economic	  organizations	  have	  failed	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  the	  changes	  resulting	  from	  globalization.	  Trade	   liberalization	  has	  played	  a	   significant	   role	   in	  globalization,	  yet	   the	  extent	  of	  those	   benefitting	   from	   trade	   policies	   has	   come	   into	   question.	   It	   is	   increasingly	  recognized	   that	   trade	   policies	   are	   not	   limited	   to	   economic	   impacts,	   but	   go	   far	  beyond	  to	  include	  a	  range	  of	  social	  issues	  including	  human	  rights.	   	  As	  explained	  so	  eloquently	   above	   in	   the	   introductory	   quote,	   Pillay	   describes	   that	   trade	   has	   led	   to	  inequality,	   has	   disempowered	   marginalized	   populations	   in	   the	   prioritization	   of	  strengthened	  markets,	  and	  has	  weakened	  the	  role	  of	  states,	  which	  are	  relied	  upon	  to	  promote	  human	  rights.6	  As	  such,	  analysis	  measuring	   the	  economic	   impact	  of	   trade	  policies	   and	   efficiencies	   on	   its	   own	   is	   not	   sufficient.	   A	   human	   rights	   based	  perspective	  offers	  a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  impacts	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  trade	  policy	  formation	   and	   implementation	   on	   non-­‐economic	   impacts	   of	   trade,	   thereby	  addressing	  a	  shortcoming	  to	  the	  current	  approach.	  	   Although	   some	   institutions,	   such	   as	   the	   World	   Trade	   Organization,	   the	  International	  Labor	  Organization	  and	  the	  US	  Government,	  now	  recognize	  the	  social	  impacts	   resulting	   from	   trade,	   they	   have	   yet	   to	   incorporate	   human	   rights	   in	   a	  structurally	  significant	  way.	  Further,	  the	  predominant	  state-­‐based	  approach,	  known	  as	  the	  ‘statist	  model,’	  limits	  state	  accountability	  to	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  in	  an	  age	  of	  transnational	  policies.	  	  This	  has	  led	  to	  governance	  gaps	  in	  the	  case	  of	  many	  human	  rights	  violations	  resulting	  from	  trade	  policies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  “Pacific	  Trade	  and	  the	  Right	  to	  Health,”	  2.	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   This	   thesis	  seeks	   to	  reconstruct	   the	  mainstream	  debate	  by	  adding	  a	  human	  rights	   perspective	   to	   the	   international	   trade	   literature.	   As	   such,	   and	   as	   will	   be	  further	   elaborated	   in	   my	   methodology	   section,	   a	   human	   rights	   based	   approach	  (HRBA)	   is	   utilized	   as	   the	   policy	   tool	   to	   evaluate	   US	   trade	   agreements.	   A	   human	  rights	  based	  approach	   to	   trade	  requires	  assessing	   trade	  agreements,	   including	   the	  processes	   associated	  with	  negotiating	   and	   implementing	   them,	   against	   the	  human	  rights	  principles	  of	  participation,	  equitable	  development	  and	  accountability.7	  	   While	  the	  entirety	  of	  trade	  agreements	  impact	  human	  rights,	  this	  thesis	  will	  focus	   on	   the	   labor	   chapters	   in	   US	   trade	   agreements.	   To	   date,	   these	   chapters	  reference	   the	   ‘core	   labor	   standards’	   as	   defined	   by	   the	   International	   Labor	  Organization	   (ILO).	   These	   include	   freedom	   of	   association,	   collective	   bargaining,	  freedom	   from	   forced	   labor	   and	   child	   labor,	   and	   non-­‐discrimination.8	  Using	   the	  principles	  outlined	  in	  the	  HRBA,	  the	  successes	  and	  failures	  of	  US	  trade	  agreements	  to	  achieve	  these	  core	  labor	  standards	  will	  be	  evaluated.9	  	   This	  thesis	  first	  argues	  that	  the	  unequal	  participation	  of	  states,	  business	  and	  labor	  in	  the	  negotiations	  of	  trade	  agreements	  ultimately	  results	  in	  ineffective	  labor	  provisions.	  By	  using	  textual	  analysis,	  evaluation	  of	  recent	  changes	  to	  labor	  chapters	  in	  US	   trade	   agreements	   reveals	   that,	   despite	  modifications,	   the	   provisions	   remain	  unlikely	  to	  be	  effective.	  This	  claim	  is	   further	  substantiated	  in	  the	  following	  section	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  “Pacific	  Trade	  and	  Human	  Rights”	  (United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme;	  World	  Health	  Organization;	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  2014),	  19,	  http://www.wpro.who.int/southpacific/publications/trade_and_human_rights.pdf?ua=1.	  8	  International	  Labour	  Organization,	  “ILO	  Declaration	  on	  Fundamental	  Principles	  and	  Rights	  at	  Work,”	  n.d.,	  http://www.ilo.org/declaration/lang-­‐-­‐en/index.htm.	  9	  “ILO	  Declaration	  on	  Fundamental	  Principles	  and	  Rights	  at	  Work:	  Background,”	  International	  Labour	  
Organization,	  accessed	  January	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/background/lang-­‐-­‐en/index.htm.	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through	  an	  assessment	  of	   the	   impact	  of	   labor	  provisions	  on	   legal	  and	   institutional	  reform	   in	   countries	   that	   are	   trading	   partners	   with	   the	   US.	   While	   legal	   and	  institutional	  reform	  could	  support	  changes	  on	  the	  ground,	  current	  efforts	  have	  not	  resulted	   in	   the	   enhancement	   of	   labor	   rights.	   And	   last,	   the	   lack	   of	   comprehensive	  international	   oversight,	   the	   limited	   nature	   of	   state	   duties,	   and	   the	   lack	   of	   binding	  obligations	   on	   business	   together	   result	   in	   a	   governance	   gap,	   leaving	   workers	  without	  an	  effective	  accountability	  mechanism.	  
	  
2.	  BACKGROUND	  INFORMATION	  
	  This	   section	   contextualizes	   the	   current	  mainstream	   economic	   discourse	   on	   trade,	  showing	  how	  human	  rights	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  systematically	  incorporated,	  and	  provides	  a	  description	  of	  how	  labor	  provisions	  were	  first	  adopted	  in	  trade	  agreements.	  Next,	  a	   brief	   overview	  of	   the	   effects	   of	   trade	   on	   equality,	   among	   and	  within	   states,	  will	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  evaluating	  human	  rights	  impacts	  of	  trade	  agreements	  beyond	  economic	   terms.	   And	   finally,	   the	   human	   rights	   based	   approach	   to	   trade	   will	   be	  explained	  as	  the	  selected	  methodology.	  	  
	  
2.1	  Contextualizing	  the	  Current	  Economic	  Discourse	  on	  Trade	  Instead	   of	   applying	   human	   rights	   principles	   as	   an	   evaluative	   framework	   of	   trade,	  current	   liberal	   economic	   policies	   operate	   with	   the	   underlying	   assumption	   that	  economic	   development	   yields	   improved	   human	   rights.	   10 	  Before	   analyzing	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Anja	  Mihr	  and	  Mark	  Gibney,	  eds.,	  The	  SAGE	  Handbook	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  Two	  Volume	  Set	  (SAGE	  Publications	  Ltd,	  2014),	  375.	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shortcomings	   of	   this	   fundamental	   assumption,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   understand	   its	  origin	  and	  main	  tenets.	  	   Today’s	   liberal	   economic	   policies	   are	   a	   result	   of	   the	   intricate	   link	   between	  trade	   and	   globalization.	   The	   world	   has	   globalized	   not	   only	   because	   trade	   has	  increased	  exponentially	  but	  also	  as	  a	  result	  of	  trade	  reaching	  farther	  and	  wider	  than	  ever	  before.	  Globalization	  has	  been	  significantly	  influenced	  “…according	  to	  the	  rules,	  norms	   and	   ideas	   of	   the	   regime	   of	   economic	   liberalization.”11	  Liberal	   economic	  policies	   are	   characterized	   by	   freer	   markets,	   the	   removal	   of	   protective	   barriers,	  privatization	  and	  deregulation.12	  	  	   Spurred	  by	  globalization,	   liberal	  market	   economies	   soon	  became	   the	  norm.	  “By	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,”	   Sachs	   wrote,	   “…almost	   the	   entire	   world	   had	   adopted	   the	  fundamental	  elements	  of	  a	  market	  economy…”13	  Taking	  this	  idea	  a	  step	  further,	  Ake	  likened	  liberalized	  markets	  to	  “something	  close	  to	  a	  global	  theology.”14	  	  	  	   Trade	   policies	   emerged	   as	   part	   of	   this	   liberal	   economic	   agenda.	  Developed	  countries15,	   such	   as	   the	  US,	   viewed	   the	  utility	   of	   trade	   in	   terms	  of	   its	   effect	   on	   its	  domestic	   workforce	   including	   how	   trade	   impacted	   skilled	   versus	   unskilled	   labor	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  outsourcing	  jobs.	  The	  discourse	  often	  ended	  there;	  the	  rights	  of	  workers	  were	  relevant	  only	  in	  so	  much	  as	  they	  influenced	  American	  employment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Ibid.	  12	  Michael	  Freeman,	  Human	  Rights :	  An	  Interdisciplinary	  Approach	  (Malden,	  MA:	  Blackwell,	  2002).	  13	  Jeffrey	  D.	  Sachs,	  “Twentieth-­‐Century	  Political	  Economy:	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Global	  Capitalism,”	  
Oxford	  Review	  of	  Economic	  Policy,	  1999,	  90–101.	  14	  Claude	  Ake,	  Democracy	  and	  Development	  in	  Africa	  (Washington,	  D.C.:	  Brookings	  Institution,	  c1996).	  15	  While	  I	  recognize	  that	  categorizing	  countries	  based	  on	  developed	  and	  developing	  is	  narrow,	  the	  mainstream	  dialogue	  excludes	  a	  more	  nuanced	  discussion.	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opportunities.	   Trade’s	   impact	   on	   worker’s	   rights	   as	   a	   whole	   was	   often	   excluded	  from	  the	  discourse.16	  	   When	  labor	  rights	  were	  first	  introduced,	  developed	  countries	  included	  labor	  provisions	  because	  they	  were	  able	  to	  use	  them	  to	  justify	  adjustments	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  trade	   outlined	   in	   trade	   policies.	   Labor	   provisions	   thus	   serve	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   further	  material	   interests	   of	   such	   states	   by	   allowing	   for	   protection	   against	   competitive	  imports	  from	  the	  violating	  state,	  and	  thus	  increasing	  US	  production.17	  	  	   In	   terms	  of	  developing	   countries,	   economists	  promoted	   trade	   liberalization	  as	   a	   significant	   component	   of	   the	   process	   of	   development;	   economic	   growth	  resulting	   from	   trade	   was	   considered	   to	   have	   a	   positive	   role	   in	   a	   developing	  country’s	   collective	   development.	   Increased	   development	   was	   thought	   to	   be	   the	  natural	  gateway	  to	  improved	  human	  rights.18	  	  	   Moreover,	  Krugman	  argues	  that	  job	  creation,	  no	  matter	  the	  associated	  labor	  standards,	  can	  further	  the	  economy	  of	  a	  developing	  country	  as	  a	  whole.	  A	  question	  raised	   frequently	   is	  whether	  a	   job	  earning	  a	   low	  wages	  or	  without	  adequate	   labor	  standards	   is	   better	   than	   the	   alternative	   of	   no	   job.	   Krugman	   points	   out	   that	   low	  wages	  have	  provided	  developing	  countries	  a	  comparative	  advantage	  to	  trade	  in	  the	  global	   market.19	  He	   takes	   a	   consequentialist	   perspective	   of	   “Third	   World	   export	  industries”	   which	   is	   that	   denying	   cheap	   labor	   has	   the	   potential	   consequence	   of	  costing	  the	  countries	  industrialization,	  and	  thus	  growth.	  His	  argument,	  therefore,	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  David	  Wessel	  and	  Bob	  Davis,	  “Pain	  From	  Free	  Trade	  Spurs	  Second	  Thoughts,”	  The	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal,	  March	  28,	  2007.	  17	  Robert	  Howse,	  “The	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Workers’	  Rights,”	  The	  Journal	  
of	  Small	  and	  Emerging	  Business	  Law	  131	  (1999).	  18	  Evans,	  “Citizenship	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  Globalization,”	  419.	  19	  Paul	  Krugman,	  The	  Accidental	  Theorist	  and	  Other	  Dispatches	  from	  the	  Dismal	  Science	  (New	  York,	  London:	  W.W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  1998).	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prioritizing	   the	  outcome	  of	  overall	  economic	  growth	  via	   trade	  as	  ultimately	  better	  for	  a	  country,	  despite	   the	  potential	   implications	   for	  human	  rights	  violations	   in	   the	  process.	  	  	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  many	  developing	  countries	  oppose	  labor	  provisions	  in	  trade	  because	  it	  works	  against	  their	  comparative	  advantage	  to	  improve	  their	  economies.	  Developing	   countries	   endowed	   with	   labor	   find	   their	   strongest	   tool	   used	   against	  them	  and	  interfering	  in	  trade,	  and	  thus	  economic	  growth.	  Developing	  countries	  have	  argued	   that	   developed	   countries	   were	   not	   burdened	   by	   this	   standard	   when	   they	  were	  in	  a	  similar	  stage	  of	  development.20	  Such	  arguments	  go	  back	  to	  the	  economic	  principle	   that	   improved	   economic	   growth	   should	   be	   the	   paramount	   objective	   for	  developing	  countries	  with	  less	  regard	  to	  human	  rights	  standards.	  	   While	   current	   economic	   discourse	   regarding	   trade	   has	  marginally	   changed	  over	   the	   years,	   the	   focus	   remains	   on	   liberal	   economic	   policies.	  When	   it	   comes	   to	  developed	   countries,	   trade	   is	   analyzed	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   affect	   on	   the	   domestic	  employment.	   And	   in	   developing	   countries,	   economists	   still	   maintain	   that	   trade	  yields	   economic	   growth	   and	   development,	   which	   in	   turn	   paves	   the	   way	   for	  improved	  human	   rights.	  As	  will	   be	  discussed	  below,	   this	  discourse	   falls	   short	   and	  instead	  ought	  to	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  human	  rights	  based	  approach.	  	  
2.2	   International	   Governance	   Structures	   and	   the	   Introduction	   of	   Labor	  
Provisions	  The	   relevant	   international	   institutions	   on	   labor	   and	   trade	   are	   the	   World	   Trade	  Organization	   and	   the	   International	   Labor	   Organization.	   The	   main	   international	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Howse,	  “The	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  and	  the	  Protection	  of	  Workers’	  Rights.”	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economic	   institution	   of	   relevance	   is	   the	  World	   Trade	   Organization	   (WTO),	   which	  facilitates	  cooperation	  amongst	  states,	  defines	  trade	  policies,	  and	  aims	  to	  construct	  reliable	   and	   freer	   markets.21	  However,	   the	   WTO	   does	   not	   recognize	   labor	   as	   a	  legitimate	   rationale	   or	   justification	   for	   interfering	   with	   trading	   policies,	   and	   has	  conferred	  responsibility	  to	  cover	  the	  trade	  and	  labor	  link	  to	  the	  International	  Labor	  Organization	  (ILO).22	  	  	   While	  the	  ILO	  recognizes	  the	  potential	  of	  trade	  policies	  in	  contributing	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  labor	  standards,	  the	  ILO	  does	  not	  engage	  in	  trade	  policy	  formation	  or	   implementation	   except	   in	   select	   cases,	   such	   as	   the	   US-­‐Cambodia	   Textile	  Agreement. 23 	  Accordingly,	   there	   are	   no	   multilateral	   agencies	   regulating	   trade	  policies	  for	  their	  impact	  on	  labor	  rights.	  	  	   As	  such,	  states	  are	  not	  held	  accountable	  by	  an	   international	  organization	   in	  the	   design	   and	   content	   of	   trade	   policies,	   which	   have	   direct	   repercussions	   on	   the	  realization	  of	  rights.	  The	  global	  market	  is	  perceived	  as	  “weakly	  embedded,”	  due	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  institutions	  and	  regulation	  at	  the	  global	  level.24	  	  	   Acknowledgement	   of	   the	   negative	   implications	   for	   human	   rights	   resulting	  from	   economic	   liberalization	   has	   led	   to	   reform	   efforts	   of	   international	   economic	  institutions;	  “[h]owever,	  these	  reforms	  have	  followed	  the	  rules	  and	  norms	  inherent	  in	  these	  very	  institutions	  and	  therefore	  have	  not	  dissolved	  the	  cemented	  separation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  “The	  WTO,”	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  accessed	  November	  1,	  2015,	  https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm.	  22	  World	  Trade	  Organization,	  Singapore	  Ministerial	  Declaration,	  1996,	  https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres96_e/wtodec.htm.	  23	  Francis	  Maupain,	  The	  Future	  of	  the	  International	  Labour	  Organization	  in	  the	  Global	  Economy	  (Hart	  Publishing,	  2013).	  24	  Dani	  Rodrik,	  The	  Globalization	  Paradox:	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  the	  World	  Economy,	  Chapter	  4:	  “Bretton	  Woods,	  GATT,	  and	  the	  WTO”	  (New	  York	  and	  London,	  2011);	  Freeman,	  Human	  Rights,	  2002.	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from	   the	   human	   rights	   framework.”25 	  An	   inability	   to	   modify	   the	   international	  trading	  system	  is	  evidenced	  in	  the	  recent	  collapse	  of	  Doha	  Round	  negotiations,	  the	  so	   called	   Development	   Round	   of	   trade	   negotiations	   between	   WTO	   member	  governments,	  aimed	  to	  remove	  inequalities	  in	  the	  trading	  system	  itself	  that	  hinder	  benefits	   of	   developing	   countries.26	  Numerous	   initiatives	   are	   currently	   underway	  with	   the	  aim	  of	   redesigning	   institutions	   to	  meet	   the	   complexities	  of	   trade,	   further	  evidence	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  current	  institutions	  to	  modernize.27	  	   The	  lack	  of	  effective	  global	  institutions	  to	  adequately	  address	  the	  intersection	  of	   trade	   and	   labor	   has	   meant	   that	   industrialized	   developed	   nations	   are	   able	   to	  dominate	  on	   the	   international	   arena.	  As	   argued	  by	   Stiglitz,	   “[e]conomics	  has	  been	  driving	   globalization…But	  politics	   has	   shaped	   it.	   The	   rules	   of	   the	   game	  have	  been	  largely	   set	   by	   the	   advanced	   industrial	   countries…and,	   not	   surprisingly,	   they	   have	  shaped	   globalization	   to	   further	   their	   own	   interests.”28 	  While	   the	   international	  economic	   institutions	   have	   disregarded	   labor,	   developed	   countries	   have	  incorporated	  social	  clauses	  in	  bilateral	  and	  regional	  trade	  agreements,	  as	  has	  been	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  US	  and	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  particular.	  Preferring	  not	  to	   lose	  out	   on	   the	   economic	   benefits	   within	   a	   trade	   agreement,	   developing	   countries	  include	  labor	  provisions	  in	  trade	  agreements.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Mihr	  and	  Gibney,	  The	  SAGE	  Handbook	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  Two	  Volume	  Set,	  375.	  26	  Joseph	  E.	  Stiglitz	  and	  Andrew	  Charlton,	  Fair	  Trade	  for	  All:	  How	  Trade	  Can	  Promote	  Development	  (Okford	  University	  Press,	  2006).	  27	  Richard	  Baldwin,	  “21st	  Century	  Regionalism:	  Filling	  the	  Gap	  between	  21st	  Century	  Trade	  and	  20th	  Century	  Trade	  Rules”	  (WTO	  Staff	  Working	  Paper	  ERSD-­‐2011-­‐08,	  May	  23,	  2011);	  Robert	  M.	  Stern,	  “Globalization	  and	  International	  Trade	  Policies,”	  World	  Scientific	  Publishing	  Co,	  2009;	  “Everybody’s	  Business:	  Strengthening	  International	  Cooperation	  in	  an	  Interdependent	  World	  -­‐	  Report	  of	  the	  Global	  Redesign	  Initiative”	  (World	  Economic	  Forum,	  2010).	  28	  Joseph	  E.	  Stiglitz,	  Making	  Globalization	  Work	  (W.	  W.	  Norton	  &	  Company,	  2007),	  4.	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   The	  US	  was	  one	  of	  many	  actors	  who	  advocated	  that	  the	  WTO	  include	  social	  clauses	  in	  international	  trade	  policies	  in	  the	  1990’s.	  It	  is	  now	  customary	  in	  the	  US	  to	  include	  social	  clauses	   in	  trade	  agreements,	  comprising	  of	   labor	  and	  environmental	  provisions.	  29	  The	   first	   trade	   agreement	   to	   include	   labor	   provisions	  was	   the	  North	  American	   Free	   Trade	   Agreement	   (NAFTA),	  which	   came	   into	   force	   in	   1994.	   	   Since	  NAFTA,	  the	  US	  has	  entered	  into	  14	  trade	  agreements	  between	  20	  countries	  that	  all	  include	  labor	  provisions.30	  	  	   The	   US	   is	   one	   of	   12	   countries	   that	   recently	   concluded	   negotiations	   on	   the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	   Partnership	   (TPP).	   This	   trade	   agreement,	   which	   includes	   labor	  provisions,	   could	   be	   the	   largest	   agreement	   to	   date	   if	   subsequently	   passed	   by	   US	  Congress,	   representing	   approximately	   40%	   of	   the	   world	   economy.31	  Given	   the	  frequent	   inclusion	   of	   labor	   provisions	   in	   US	   trade	   agreements,	   evaluating	   their	  effectiveness	  is	  one	  important	  aspect	  to	  understanding	  their	  influence	  on	  workers.	  	  	  
2.3	  Effects	  of	  Trade	  on	  Inequality	  Among	  and	  Within	  States	  It	   is	  widely	  acknowledged	  that	  trade	  liberalization	  has	  produced	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	   effects	   in	   terms	   of	   development.	   While	   increased	   trade	   may	   lead	   to	  economic	  growth	  as	  measured	  in	  GDP,	  GDP	  growth	  alone	  is	  not	  an	  indicator	  of	  social	  development.32	  Winners	   and	   losers	   exist	   not	   only	   on	   the	   national	   level	  where	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  “Trade	  Agreements:	  Home	  Page,”	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative,	  accessed	  November	  5,	  2015,	  https://ustr.gov/trade-­‐agreements.	  30	  Ibid.	  31	  Pedro	  Nicolaci	  da	  Costa	  and	  Cathleen	  Cimino-­‐Isaacs,	  “TPP	  Nears	  the	  Goal	  Line:	  The	  Trade	  Deal	  at	  a	  Glance,”	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  International	  Economics,	  October	  2,	  2015,	  http://blogs.piie.com/trade/?p=435.	  32	  Thomas	  Carothers	  and	  Diane	  De	  Gramont,	  Development	  Aid	  Confronts	  Politics:	  The	  Almost	  
Revolution,	  Chapter	  2:	  “Apolitical	  Roots”	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Carnegie	  Endowment	  for	  International	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rich	   are	   getting	   richer,	   the	  middle	   class	   is	   narrowing	   and	   the	   poor	   are	   left	   at	   the	  margins; 33 	  but	   as	   well	   at	   the	   international	   level	   studies	   show	   that	   trade	  liberalization	  benefits	   the	  wealthiest	   countries	  most.34	  A	   study	  by	   the	  World	  Bank	  found	  that	  more	  than	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  gains	  from	  trade	  liberalization	  are	  estimated	  to	   go	   to	   rich	   countries.35	  This	   is	   evidence	   that	   current	   trade	   institutions	   are	   not	  structured	  in	  a	  way	  that	  leads	  to	  equal	  development.36	  	  	   A	   holistic	   lens	   that	   incorporates	   social	   indicators	   is	   needed	   in	   order	   to	  provide	  a	  more	  nuanced	  perspective	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  liberal	  economic	  trade	  policies	  on	   equity	   and	  welfare.37	  However,	   the	   approach	   currently	   taken	   remains	   one	   that	  focuses	   on	   the	   economic	   implications	   of	   trade	   policies	   as	   opposed	   to	   equitable	  development.	  	  	   Liberal	   economic	   policies	   are	   “politically	   contentious	   because	   [they	   have]	  important	   domestic	   distributional	   consequences	   and	   because	   [they	   generate]	  clashes	  between	  values	  and	  institutions	  in	  different	  nations.”38	  In	  1999,	  the	  Peterson	  Institute	   for	   International	   Economics	   published	   a	   policy	   brief	   concluding	   that	  equitable	   distribution	   is	   not	   ensured	   from	   the	   market	   process,	   and	   that	   “equity-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Peace,	  2013);	  F	  Rodriguez	  and	  D	  Rodrik,	  Trade	  Policy	  and	  Economic	  Growth:	  A	  Skeptic’s	  Guide	  to	  the	  
Cross	  National	  Evidence,	  1999,	  http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/skepti1299.pdf.	  33	  Martin	  Rama,	  “Globalization	  and	  Workers	  in	  Developing	  Countries,”	  World	  Bank	  Policy	  Research	  
Working	  Paper,	  no.	  2958	  (2003),	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636320;	  Michael	  Freeman,	  Development	  and	  Globalization,	  Economics	  and	  Human	  Rights,	  Human	  Rights	  (Polity,	  2002).	  34	  Frank	  Ackerman	  and	  Kevin	  P.	  Gallagher,	  “The	  Shrinking	  Gains	  from	  Global	  Trade	  Liberalization	  in	  Computable	  General	  Equilibrium	  Models,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Economy	  37,	  no.	  1	  (April	  1,	  2008):	  50.	  35	  Rama,	  “Globalization	  and	  Workers	  in	  Developing	  Countries.”	  36	  Stiglitz,	  Making	  Globalization	  Work,	  xii.	  37	  John	  Gerard	  Ruggie,	  “International	  Regimes,	  Transactions,	  and	  Change:	  Embedded	  Liberalism	  in	  the	  Postwar	  Economic	  Order,”	  International	  Organization	  36,	  no.	  02	  (1982):	  379–415.	  38	  Rodrik,	  The	  Globalization	  Paradox.	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oriented	   policies”	   should	   be	   implemented	   alongside	   market	   and	   trade	   policies.39	  Speaking	   from	   a	   human	   rights	   perspective,	   Donnelly	   argues	   that	   markets	   are	  problematic	   because	   they	   “systematically	   deprive	   some	   individuals	   in	   order	   to	  achieve	  the	  collective	  benefits	  of	  efficiency.”40	  A	  HRBA	  would	  rectify	  the	  challenges	  identified	  by	  these	  scholars.	  	  	   Data	  reveals	  substantial	  growth	  of	  the	  global	  economy	  from	  the	  early	  1990’s	  to	   the	   mid	   2000’s;	   however,	   during	   the	   same	   time	   period	   “...income	   distribution	  showed	   systemic	   losses	   for	   labour	   despite	   an	   increase	   in	   global	   employment	  rates.”41	  A	   number	   of	   studies	   evidence	   the	   decline	   in	   the	   labor	   share	   of	   national	  income	  distribution	  in	  developing	  countries,	  which	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  household	   income	   and	   consumption.42	  A	   combination	   of	   factors	   contributes	   to	  labor’s	   income	   share	   decreasing,	   of	   which	   include	   globalization	   and	   international	  trade.43	  	  	   International	  bodies	  such	  as	  the	  Office	  of	   the	  High	  Commissioner	  of	  Human	  Rights	   (OHCHR)	   have	   recognized	   that	   the	   “ideological	   edifices	   of	   the	   dominant	  economic	  models	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  centuries	  are	  crumbling	  under	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Cline,	  “Trade	  and	  Income	  Distribution:	  The	  Debate	  and	  New	  Evidence,”	  Peterson	  Institute	  for	  
International	  Economics,	  September	  1999,	  http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchID=94.	  40	  Jack	  Donnelly,	  “Human	  Rights,	  Democracy,	  and	  Development,”	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  21,	  no.	  3	  (1999):	  628.	  41	  “Statement	  Submitted	  by	  ITUC,	  EI,	  PSI	  and	  EFJ	  to	  the	  Eight	  Session	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  Open	  Working	  Group	  on	  Sustainable	  Development	  Goals,”	  International	  Trade	  Union	  Confederation,	  n.d.,	  2–3,	  http://www.ituc-­‐csi.org/IMG/pdf/owg8_mg_workers_and_trade_unions_gender_equality.pdf.	  42	  “Global	  Wage	  Report	  2014/2015:	  Wages	  and	  Income	  Inequality”	  (Geneva:	  International	  Labour	  Organization,	  2015),	  10.	  43	  Ibid.,	  11.	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weight	  of	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐first.”44	  Practically	  speaking,	  the	  incorporation	  of	   human	   rights	   in	   trade	   policies	   depends	   upon	   modification	   of	   international	  structures	   that	   would	   constrain	   the	   influence	   currently	   wielded	   by	   developed	  states.45	  There	   is	   little	   incentive	   for	   developed	   and	   powerful	   states	   to	   concede	  power	   control	   within	   financial	   and	   trade	   institutions,	   due	   to	   the	   considerable	  economic	  implications	  that	  any	  changes	  could	  have	  for	  them.	  	  	   The	   US	   has	   failed	   to	   address	   structural	   inequality	   and	   promote	   equitable	  development	  via	  US	  trade	  agreements.	  The	  Labor	  Advisory	  Committee	  (LAC)	  to	  the	  USTR	  did	  a	  review	  in	  2015	  of	  US	  trade	  agreements	  implemented	  since	  NAFTA	  and	  found	   that,	   despite	   evidence	   that	   liberal	   policies	   lead	   to	   inequality,	   the	   US	   has	  continued	   in	   a	   ‘business-­‐as-­‐usual’	   approach	   in	   formulating	   the	   recent	   TPP	   trade	  policies.46	  The	  Executive	  Director	  of	  a	  Mexican	  human	  rights	  organization	  puts	  into	  context	  the	  effects	  neo-­‐liberal	  NAFTA	  policies	  have	  had:	  For	  Mexico,	  the	  signing	  of	  NAFTA,	  which	  is	  the	  closest	  reference	  for	  what	  may	   occur	   with	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   TPP,	   led	   to	   the	  implementation	   of	   structural	   reforms	   that	   have	   meant	   the	   loss	   of	  fundamental	   human	   rights…	  The	   signing	   of	   these	   trade	   agreements,	   in	  which	   transnational	   corporations	   play	   a	   determining	   role,	  …	   cause	   the	  implementation	   of	   policies,	   translated	   into	   structural	   reforms,	   which	  shall	  increase	  violations	  of	  rights	  and	  lead	  to	  the	  government’s	  failure	  to	  fulfill	   its	  principle	  obligations:	  to	  protect,	  respect	  and	  guarantee	  human	  rights.47	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Navi	  Pillay,	  “Introduction	  Statement:	  Essays	  in	  Commemoration	  of	  25	  Years	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  on	  the	  Right	  to	  Development,”	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  accessed	  November	  16,	  2015,	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Development/Pages/IntroductionStatement.aspx.	  45	  Margot	  E.	  Salomon,	  “Legal	  Cosmopolitanism	  and	  the	  Normative	  Contribution	  of	  the	  Right	  to	  Development”	  LSE	  Law,	  Society	  and	  Economy	  Working	  Papers	  16/2008	  (2008),	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1272582.	  46	  The	  Labor	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Trade	  Negotiations	  and	  Trade	  Policy,	  “Report	  on	  the	  Impacts	  of	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership,”	  December	  2,	  2015,	  9–10.	  47	  “Top	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Experts	  Say	  TPP	  a	  Concern:	  Human	  Rights	  Assessments	  Must	  Precede	  Negotiations,”	  The	  Council	  of	  Canadians,	  n.d.,	  http://canadians.org/media/top-­‐un-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐experts-­‐say-­‐tpp-­‐concern-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐assessments-­‐must-­‐precede-­‐negotiations.	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Without	  addressing	  the	  structural	  inequalities	  of	  the	  global	  system,	  including	  those	  related	   to	   international	   trade,	  access	   to	  equitable	  development	  will	  continue	   to	  be	  impeded.	  	  	   The	   US	   fails	   to	   use	   trade	   agreements	   to	   address	   the	   inherent	   inequalities	  present	  in	  the	  international	  economic	  system.	  As	  Stiglitz	  explains,	  “…while	  increased	  trading	  opportunities	  are	  good	  for	  development	  countries,	  liberalization	  need	  to	  be	  managed	  carefully—the	  task	  is	  much	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  simple	  prescriptions	  of	  the	  Washington	  Consensus,	  which	  blithely	  exhorts	  developing	  countries	  to	  liberalize	  their	  markets	  rapidly	  and	  indiscriminately.”48	  Stiglitz	  goes	  on	  to	  discuss	  the	  kinds	  of	  changes	  that	  are	  required:	  	  “There	  are,	  of	  course,	  no	  magic	  solutions.	  But	  there	  are	  a	  multitude	  of	  changes	  to	  be	  made—in	  polices,	  in	  economic	  institutions,	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	   game,	   and	   in	   mindsets—that	   hold	   out	   the	   promise	   of	   helping…	   developing	  countries.”49	  While	   trade	  should	  of	   course	  not	  be	  abandoned,	   the	  US	  should	   find	  a	  constructive	   balance	   that	   includes	   complementary	   policies	   to	   offset	   the	   losses	   to	  those	  negatively	  impacted	  by	  trade	  policies.	  50	  	  	   The	   current	   international	   economic	   institutions	   and	   the	   global	   governance	  structures	  are	  unable	  to	  fulfill	  human	  rights	  obligations,	  and	  instead	  foster	  growing	  inequalities	   among	   and	   within	   states.	   Structural	   inequality,	   arguably	   the	   biggest	  impediment	   to	   equitable	  development,	  will	   remain	  unless	   the	  US	  and	  other	   states	  take	  action	   to	  advance	  equality	  within	   international	  economic	   institutions.	  From	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Stiglitz	  and	  Charlton,	  Fair	  Trade	  for	  All:	  How	  Trade	  Can	  Promote	  Development.	  49	  Stiglitz,	  Making	  Globalization	  Work,	  xi.	  50	  L.	  Alan	  Winters,	  “International	  Trade	  and	  Poverty:	  Cause	  or	  Cure?,”	  The	  Australian	  Economic	  
Review	  39,	  no.	  4	  (2006):	  347–58,	  doi:10.1111/j.1467-­‐8462.2006.00425.x.	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human	  rights	  based	  approach,	   it	   is	  essential	   to	  understand	  what	  this	  means	   in	  the	  context	  of	  equitable	  development.	  	  	  
2.4	  Methodology:	  Human	  Rights	  Based	  Approach	  to	  Trade	  A	   focus	   on	   economic	   impacts	   of	   trade	   agreements	   has	   led	   to	   limitations	   and	  fundamental	   flaws	   that	   prevent	   the	   respect	   and	   protection	   of	   human	   rights.	   The	  human	  rights	  based	  approach,	  the	  selected	  methodology	  for	  this	  thesis,	  provides	  an	  analytical	   framework	   that	   addresses	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   current	   trade	  institutions.	  Using	  a	  human	  rights	  based	  approach	  to	  trade,	  including	  the	  promotion	  of	   participation,	   equitable	   development	   and	   accountability,	   will	   lead	   to	   more	  effective	  trade	  policies	  that	  result	  in	  improved	  human	  rights	  outcomes.	  	  	   Equity,	  participation	  and	  accountability	  all	  build	  upon	  one	  another:	  in	  order	  for	  a	  process	  to	  be	  transparent,	  it	  must	  be	  participatory;	  and	  in	  order	  for	  a	  policy	  to	  be	  accountable,	  it	  must	  be	  designed	  inclusive	  of	  society.	  This	  inclusive	  participation	  must	  take	  place	  across	  each	  step	  of	  the	  process:	  design,	  implementation,	  impact	  and	  monitoring.	  51	  Moreover,	   understanding	   an	   approach	   in	   this	   way	   represents	   an	  evolution	  from	  the	  top-­‐down	  and	  silo	  approach	  to	  development	  that	  the	  world	  had	  taken	  up	  until	  the	  Cold	  War	  Era,52	  and	  in	  many	  regards	  continues	  today.	  	  	   Fundamental	  to	  the	  HRBA	  is	  the	  realization	  of	  human	  rights,	  understood	  not	  only	   as	   a	   goal,	   but	   a	  means	   to	   achieve	   the	   goal.53	  Thus,	   the	  promotion	  of	   rights	   is	  integral	  to	  the	  process	  of	  rights	  realization,	  not	  only	  important	  as	  an	  outcome.	  This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme,	  “Governance	  for	  Sustainable	  Human	  Development,”	  UNDP	  Governance	  Policy	  Document	  (New	  York,	  1997).	  52	  Brigitte	  I.	  Hamm,	  “A	  Human	  Rights	  Approach	  to	  Development,”	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  23,	  no.	  4	  (2001):	  1005–31,	  doi:10.1353/hrq.2001.0055.	  53	  “HRBA	  Portal,”	  accessed	  November	  11,	  2015,	  http://hrbaportal.org/the-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐based-­‐approach-­‐to-­‐development-­‐cooperation-­‐towards-­‐a-­‐common-­‐understanding-­‐among-­‐un-­‐agencies.	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implies	  that	  trade	  policies	  ought	  to	  uphold	  rights	  as	  objectives,	  as	  well	  as	  integrate	  rights	  into	  the	  process	  of	  policy	  formation,	  implementation	  and	  impact.	  	   A	   HRBA	   affirms	   the	   universalism	   of	   rights	   as	   inherent	   to	   each	   individual	  derived	   from	   the	   mere	   fact	   of	   being	   human.	   Rights	   do	   not	   stem	   from	   a	   single	  nationality,	   culture,	   religion,	   or	   race	   but	   apply	   to	   all	   humans	   indiscriminately.	  Rather,	   all	   individuals	   are	   entitled	   to	   all	   rights	   from	   civil	   and	   political	   rights	   to	  economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	   rights,	   all	   understood	   to	   be	   indivisible	   and	  interdependent.54	  The	  principle	  of	   interdependence	  recognizes	  multiple	  causalities	  as	   opposed	   to	   a	   more	   limited	   vision	   of	   cause	   and	   effect,	   demonstrating	   the	  indivisibility	  of	  rights.55	  	   The	  HRBA	   is	  a	  participatory	  approach	   that	   requires	  a	   reversal	  of	   top-­‐down	  thinking;	  and	  instead	  includes	  actors	  at	  all	   levels,	  with	  special	  attention	  to	  matters	  of	  inequality,	  discrimination	  and	  inclusion	  of	  marginalized	  groups.56	  Participation	  is	  seen	  as	  a	   tool	   for	   empowerment,	  whereby	   individuals	   are	  agents	  of	   change	   in	   the	  realization	  of	   rights.57	  The	  approach	   is	  meant	   to	   apply	   to	   all	   phases	  of	   a	  program,	  from	   design	   to	   implementation,	   with	   monitoring	   taking	   place	   throughout	   each	  phase.	   Hamm	   considers	   it	   to	   be	   a	   duty	   of	   those	   with	   authority	   to	   ensure	  participation,	  as	  opposed	  to	  paternalism	  or	  charity.	  Uvin	  similarly	  deems	  important	  that	  opportunities	  to	  participate	  “…are	  not	  dependent	  on	  the	  whim	  of	  a	  benevolent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  World	  Conference	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  Vienna	  Declaration	  and	  Programme	  of	  Action,	  1993,	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Vienna.aspx.	  55	  J	  Harrison,	  “Human	  Rights	  Impact	  Assessments	  of	  Trade	  Agreements:	  Reflections	  on	  Practice	  and	  Principles	  for	  Future	  Assessments,”	  A	  background	  Paper	  for	  the	  expert	  seminar	  on	  human	  rights	  impact	  assessments	  of	  trade	  and	  investment	  agreements	  (Geneva,	  June	  23,	  2010),	  5.	  56	  Milan	  Brahmbhatt	  and	  Otaviano	  Canuto,	  The	  Economics	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  MDGs	  in	  Practice,	  MDGs	  and	  Human	  Rights:	  Past,	  Present	  and	  Future	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  57	  Hamm,	  “A	  Human	  Rights	  Approach	  to	  Development.”	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outsider,	   but	   rooted	   in	   institutions	   and	   procedures.”58 	  Therefore,	   participation	  constitutes	  a	  fundamental	  component	  of	  a	  HRBA.	  	   Finally,	  the	  HRBA	  moves	  beyond	  rights	  as	  merely	   ‘doing	  good’	  and	  assumes	  legal	  obligations	  to	  human	  rights.59	  States	  have	  a	  common	  duty	  to	  uphold	  the	  human	  rights	  treaties	  respectively	  signed,	  requiring	  the	  structuring	  of	  policies	  and	  efforts	  to	  maintain	   accordance	   with	   these	   legal	   obligations.	   Grounded	   in	   rights,	   the	   HRBA	  structures	  obligations	  jointly	  among	  states.60	  This	  offers	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	   structure	   of	   accountability	   within	   the	   rights	   framework;	   a	   dual	   structure	   of	  accountability	   is	   important	   for	   rights	   holders	   considering	   that	   trade	   policies	   have	  inter-­‐state	  impact.	  	   The	   HRBA	   is	   being	   interpreted	   by	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   relevant	   actors;	  nevertheless,	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  overlapping	  throughout	  the	  range	  of	  interpretations	  includes:	  participation,	  non-­‐discrimination,	  equality	  and	  accountability.	  While	  these	  are	   not	   new	   principles,	   the	   features	   having	   preceded	   even	   the	   human	   rights	  framework,	   the	   real	   strength	   of	   the	   HRBA	   hinges	   on	   its	   successful	  operationalization.61	  	   While	   the	  HRBA	   is	   relatively	   new,	   the	   operationalization	   of	   the	   framework	  has	  drawn	  parallels	   to	  the	  anti-­‐colonial	  social	  movements	   for	  self-­‐determination.62	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Peter	  Uvin,	  “From	  the	  Right	  to	  Development	  to	  the	  Rights-­‐Based	  Approach:	  How	  ‘Human	  Rights’	  Entered	  Development,”	  Development	  in	  Practice	  17,	  no.	  4/5	  (August	  1,	  2007):	  603,	  doi:10.1080/09614520701469617.	  59	  “Human	  Rights	  and	  Human	  Development,”	  Human	  Development	  Report	  (New	  York:	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Programme,	  2000).	  60	  Hamm,	  “A	  Human	  Rights	  Approach	  to	  Development.”	  61	  Celestine	  Nyamu-­‐Musembi	  and	  Andrea	  Cornwall,	  “What	  Is	  the	  ‘Rights-­‐Based	  Approach’	  All	  about?	  Perspective	  from	  International	  Development	  Agencies”	  (Institute	  of	  Development	  Studies,	  November	  2004).	  62	  Ibid.,	  6–8.	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The	  post-­‐cold	  war	  environment,	  with	  a	  push	  for	  the	  interdependence	  of	  all	  rights,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  entry	  of	  development	  countries	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN)	  system	  demanding	   reforms	   for	   an	   equitable	   international	   order,	   contributed	   to	   the	  integration	  of	  rights	  and	  development.	  The	  Vienna	  Conference	  in	  1993	  is	  highlighted	  in	  particular	  for	  promoting	  the	  integration	  of	  rights	  and	  development.	  Followed	  by	  the	  World	   Social	   Development	   Summit	   in	   Copenhagen	   in	   1995	  where	   a	   group	   of	  NGOs	   campaigned	   for	   a	   HRBA.63	  The	   UN	   Programme	   for	   Reform	   called	   for	   the	  mainstreaming	  of	  human	  rights	   in	  policy	  and	  practice	  within	  all	  UN	  bodies,	  across	  all	   sectors,	   and	   throughout	   international,	   regional	   and	   local	   offices.	   A	   HRBA	   has	  been	  commonly	  selected	  as	  the	  method	  to	  employ	  this	  objective.64	  	   To	   date,	   the	   HRBA	   has	   been	   utilized	   most	   commonly	   in	   international	  development	   programming	   and	   has	   not	   been	   common	   practice	   in	   the	   context	   of	  economic	  institutions.	  Nevertheless,	  a	  variety	  of	  actors,	  working	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  topics,	   have	   successfully	   adapted	   the	   HRBA.	   Thus,	   there	   is	   no	   indication	   that	   the	  framework	  would	  not	  work	  for	  implementation	  in	  economic	  policies.	  	  	   In	  December	  2012,	  the	  UN	  General	  Assembly	  passed	  resolution	  67/171	  that	  calls	   for	   trade	   institutions	   and	   trade	   policies	   to	   pursue	   economic	   justice	   as	   an	  objective.65	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  the	  aims	  of	  a	  HRBA	  to	  trade,	  the	  existing	  framework	  must	  transform	  “from	  engines	  of	  economic	  growth	  into	  a	  multi-­‐purpose	  framework	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Ibid.,	  10–11.	  64	  “HRBA	  Portal.”	  65	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  67/171,	  A/RES/67/171,	  2012,	  http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/171.	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for	   the	   promotion	   of	   holistic,	   people-­‐centered	   development.”66	  The	   Office	   of	   the	  High	  Commission	  for	  Human	  Rights	  (OHCHR)	  has	  been	  directed	  to	  take	  forward	  this	  mandate,	   and	   OHCHR	   has	   promoted	   a	   HRBA	   to	   trade	   as	   the	   policy	   tool	   to	  operationalize	  the	  aim	  of	  economic	  justice	  in	  trade	  policies.	  	  	  	   A	  HRBA	  will	  be	  used	  in	  this	  paper	  to	  analyze	  the	  approach	  taken	  by	  the	  US	  to	  formulate	  and	   implement	   labor	  provisions	   in	   trade	  agreements.	  The	  human	  rights	  focus	  will	   be	   on	   the	   labor	   chapter	   of	   trade	   agreements.	   Labor	   provisions	   are	   the	  most	  relevant	   to	  a	  discussion	  on	  the	   impacts	   to	   labor	  rights	  of	  workers	   in	  partner	  countries	  and	  offer	  the	  best	  area	  for	  analysis.	  	  	   The	   position	   taken	   in	   this	   paper	   is	   that	   the	   US	   has	   an	   obligation	   in	   the	  realization	  of	  the	  labor	  rights	  of	  those	  workers	  impacted	  by	  its	  transnational	  trade	  policies.	   By	   entering	   into	   a	   trade	   agreement,	   all	   parties	   to	   the	   policy	   have	  responsibility	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  implications	  both	  within	  and	  between	  the	  trading	  partner	  countries.	  	  	  
3.	  EVALUATION	  OF	  PARTICIPATION	  AND	  ITS	  EFFECT	  ON	  LABOR	  PROVISIONS	  	  
	  This	  section	  demonstrates	  how	  US	  trade	  policy	  formation	  lacks	  transparency:	  trade	  agreements	  are	  negotiated	  behind	  closed	  doors	  and	  drafts	  of	  trade	  agreements	  are	  not	   made	   public	   until	   after	   negotiations	   have	   been	   completed.	   This	   top-­‐down	  drafting	   of	   trade	   policies	   devalues	   and	   sometimes	   even	   lacks	   the	   important	  contributions	   and	   consensus	   of	   relevant	   actors.	   As	   they	   stand	   currently,	   trade	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  “Human	  Rights,	  Trade	  and	  Investment,”	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  accessed	  November	  11,	  2015,	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Globalization/Pages/GlobalizationIndex.aspx.	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policies	   cater	   to	   the	   economic	   interests	   of	   those	   at	   the	   negotiating	   table,	   namely	  government	   and	   business.	   These	   powerful	   actors	   are	   able	   to	   benefit	   from	   trade	  agreements	   as	   a	   tool	   to	   negotiate	   their	   interests.	   Labor	   workers	   are	   significantly	  impacted	   by	   trade	   policies,	   yet	   are	   underrepresented	   at	   the	   negotiating	   table.	  Without	  meaningful	  participation,	   labor	  provisions	  in	  particular	  will	  be	  ineffective,	  and	  the	  social	  costs	  of	  trade	  will	  fail	  to	  take	  precedence	  to	  the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  trade	  policies.	  	  	  
3.1	  Participation	  in	  the	  Negotiation	  of	  US	  Trade	  Agreements	  The	   lack	   of	   transparency	   and	   the	   undemocratic	   process	   of	   drafting	   US	   trade	  agreements	   make	   it	   impossible	   to	   analyze	   and	   evaluate	   the	   strength	   of	   labor	  provisions	  in	  advance.	  The	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  power	  among	  the	  actors	  involved	  in	   trade	   negotiations,	   including	   government,	   business,	   and	   labor,	   translates	   into	  ineffective	  labor	  provisions,	  affecting	  both	  US	  workers	  and	  workers	  abroad.	  	   The	  Office	  of	   the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative	   (USTR)	   is	   responsible	  for	   the	   development	   and	   administration	   of	   US	   trade	   agreements.	   The	   USTR	   is	  supported	  by	   the	  Advisory	  Committee	   for	  Trade	  Policy	  and	  Negotiations	   (ACTPN)	  who	  counsel	  and	  assist	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  trade	  policies.	  The	  Trade	  Representative	  and	  trade	  advisors	  are	  not	  elected	  officials,	  but	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  US	  President,	  and	   have	   traditionally	   consisted	   predominantly	   of	   business	   representatives.	  Breaking	  down	  the	  trade	  advisors	  on	  the	  ACTPN,	  one	  can	  see	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  interests	   are	   represented:	   labor	   is	   represented	   by	   5	   percent,	   government	   is	  represented	   by	   10	   percent	   and	   the	   overwhelming	   majority,	   or	   85	   percent	   of	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advisors,	   represent	   business	   interests.67	  Thus,	   the	   voice	   of	   workers	   is	   not	   well	  represented	  while	  the	  voice	  of	  business,	  which	  has	  an	  incentive	  to	  maximize	  profits	  and	  reduce	  labor	  costs,	  is	  over-­‐represented.	  	  	   Further,	   the	   trade	   representatives	   are	   not	   experts	   in	   assessing	   the	   social	  impact	   of	   labor	   standards.68	  When	   the	   US	   Government	   performs	   social	   impact	  assessments	  forecasting	  impact	  on	  workers,	  it	  narrowly	  measures	  economic	  effects.	  Once	  again,	  this	  reinforces	  trade	  concerns	  to	  be	  primarily	  an	  economic	  perspective	  and	   not	   a	   human	   rights	   issue.	   As	   has	   been	   established,	   trade	   agreements	   impact	  human	  rights	  in	  all	  trading	  countries.	  As	  such,	  human	  rights	  impact	  assessments	  are	  required	   from	   the	   onset	   of	   negotiations	   and	   throughout	   the	   agreement,	   if	   social	  impacts	  of	  labor	  provisions	  are	  to	  be	  meaningful.	  	   Moreover,	   trade	   liberalization	   “…is	   not	   gender	   neutral	   nor	   a	   uniform	  process.”69	  Trade	  policies	  create	  differentiated	  opportunities	  as	  well	  as	  adversities	  for	  women,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Trade	  and	  Development	  (UNCTAD)	  has	  called	  for	  the	  mainstreaming	  of	  gender	  in	  trade	  policies.	  This	  entails	  application	  of	  a	  gender	  lens	  during	  the	  design	  and	  implementation	  of	  trade	  policies,	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  AFL-­‐CIO,	  “Labor’s	  So-­‐Called	  ‘Seat	  at	  the	  Table’	  at	  TPP	  Negotiations,”	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  n.d.,	  http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Trade/Fast-­‐Track-­‐Legislation/Labor-­‐s-­‐So-­‐Called-­‐Seat-­‐at-­‐the-­‐Table-­‐at-­‐TPP-­‐Negotiations.	  68	  Marceline	  White,	  “Look	  FIRST	  from	  a	  Gender	  Perspective:	  NAFTA	  and	  the	  FTAA,”	  Gender	  and	  
Development	  12,	  no.	  2	  (July	  1,	  2004):	  3.	  69	  Lisa	  B	  Meyer,	  International	  Trade	  Liberalization	  and	  Gender	  Relations	  in	  Labor	  Markets:	  A	  Cross-­‐
National	  Analysis,	  1970-­‐1998	  (Ann	  Arbor,	  US:	  UMI	  Dissertations	  Publishing,	  2001),	  Abstract;	  Kate	  Higgins,	  “Gender	  and	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements:	  Best	  Practices	  and	  Policy	  Guidance”	  (The	  North-­‐South	  Institute,	  October	  2012),	  2.	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with	   attention	   to	   impacts	   on	   empowerment	   and	   inequality	   in	   particular,	   and	   to	  identify	  remedies	  when	  women	  are	  negatively	  impacted.70	  	   Other	   committees	   exist,	   such	   as	   the	   Labor	   Advisory	   Committee	   (LAC).	  However,	  the	  USTR	  is	  not	  mandated	  to	  meet	  or	  provide	  access	  to	  documents	  to	  any	  committee	   other	   than	   the	   ACTPN.	   Moreover,	   the	   USTR	   has	   been	   criticized	   for	  keeping	  the	  ACTPN	  meetings	  and	  records	  closed,	  including	  restriction	  to	  important	  information	   that	   impedes	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   LAC	   to	   advise	   on	   matters	   of	   trade	  negotiations.71	  A	  blatant	  example	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  transparency	  is	  evidenced	  in	  that	  the	  USTR	  did	  not	  substantively	  consult	  with	  the	  LAC	  on	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  TPP	  labor	  side	  agreements	  with	  Brunei,	  Vietnam	  and	  Malaysia.72	  	   Members	  of	  Congress	  have	  raised	   frustrations	  with	   the	  manner	   that	   the	  US	  Government	   negotiates	   trade	   agreements.	   Only	   select	  members	   of	   Congress	   have	  limited	  access	  to	  the	  text	  during	  negotiations,	  and	  are	  unable	  to	  seek	  input	  from	  civil	  society	   or	   labor	   representatives.	  73	  Still	   more	   concerning,	   due	   to	   the	   use	   of	   Fast	  Track	  Authority,	  there	  is	  not	  room	  for	  negotiating	  once	  the	  agreement	  is	  signed	  by	  the	  President	  and	  subsequently	  delivered	  to	  Congress	  for	  an	  up	  or	  down	  vote.	  The	  accelerated	  process	  does	  not	  allow	  Congress	  to	  amend	  any	  portion	  of	  the	  text.	  The	  use	   of	   Fast	   Track	   Authority	   is	   controversial	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	   and	   should	   be	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  UNCTAD	  Secretariat,	  “Mainstreaming	  Gender	  in	  Trade	  Policy”	  (Geneva:	  UNCTAD,	  Trade	  and	  Development	  Commission,	  March	  19,	  2009),	  13–15.	  71	  Andrea	  M	  Ewart,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Civil	  Society	  in	  Shaping	  Trade	  Policy”	  (FOCAL	  Research	  Paper,	  December	  2009);	  The	  Labor	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Trade	  Negotiations	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  Trade	  Policy,	  “Report	  on	  the	  Impacts	  of	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership,”	  11.	  72	  The	  Labor	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Trade	  Negotiations	  and	  Trade	  Policy,	  “Report	  on	  the	  Impacts	  of	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership,”	  11–12.	  73	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  “Labor’s	  So-­‐Called	  ‘Seat	  at	  the	  Table’	  at	  TPP	  Negotiations.”	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reconsidered	  as	  a	  policy.74	  Hence,	  Congress	  and	  thus	  the	  public	  are	   left	  to	  take	  the	  President	   and	   US	   Trade	   Representative	   at	   their	   word	   when	   they	   claim	   labor	  provisions	  are	  strong	  and	  enforceable;	  which	  has	  not	  proven	  dependable.75	  	   Both	  US	   labor	   and	   labor	   groups	   abroad	  are	  not	   sufficiently	   valued	   in	   trade	  negotiations.	  In	  terms	  of	  US	  labor,	  the	  American	  Federation	  of	  Labor	  and	  Congress	  of	   Industrial	  Organizations	  (AFL–CIO),	  an	  umbrella	  organization	  representing	  over	  fifty	  unions	  or	  12.5	  million	  workers,	   is	  engaged	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  LAC.	  However,	  AFL-­‐CIO	  is	  quick	  to	  reprimand	  those	  who	  confuse	  access	  with	  influence.	  Members	  of	  LAC	  do	  not	  have	  full	  access	  to	  the	  trade	  agreement	  while	  being	  negotiated,	  and	  thus	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  criticizes	   the	  process	   for	  not	  allowing	   the	  LAC	  to	  effectively	   influence	  the	   text	   of	   the	   agreement.	   Draft	   text	   that	   AFL-­‐CIO	   has	   prior	   access	   to	   review	   is	  deemed	   confidential,	   which	   limits	   them	   from	   mobilizing	   allies	   on	   behalf	   of	   their	  shared	  interests	  to	  counter	  the	  powerful	  economic	  elites	  they	  are	  up	  against.	  76	  	  	  	   In	   its	  own	  words,	   the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  describes	   the	   ineffectiveness	  of	  LAC	  from	  its	  perspective	  as	  a	  member:	  	  Perhaps	   the	   best	   proof,	   however,	   that	   the	   LAC	   has	   not	   been	   a	   valuable	  tool	  in	  creating	  people-­‐centered	  trade	  agreements	  is	  the	  actual	  content	  of	  the	  final	  agreements….	  If	  these	  trade	  agreements	  worked	  to	  create	  good	  jobs	   for	  workers,	   the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  would	  be	   fighting	   for	   them	  as	  hard	  as	  or	  harder	  than	  Wall	  Street	  and	  the	  global	  corporations	  do.	  The	  tragic	  fact	  is	  that—despite	  some	  marginal	  progress	  over	  the	  years	  in	  some	  chapters—the	   model	   hasn’t	   changed.	   This	   flawed	   model	   has	   led	   to	   many	   trade	  agreements	  that	  skew	  their	  benefits	  toward	  the	  1%	  and	  have	  exacerbated	  trade	   deficits,	   wage	   suppression,	   the	   dismantling	   of	   our	  manufacturing	  sector	  and	  income	  inequality.77	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  Eli	  J.	  Kirschner,	  “Fast	  Track	  Authority	  and	  Its	  Implication	  for	  Labor	  Protection	  in	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements,”	  Cornell	  International	  Law	  Journal	  44,	  no.	  2	  (2011):	  385.	  75	  Prepared	  by	  the	  Staff	  of	  Senator	  Elizabeth	  Warren,	  “Broken	  Promises:	  Decades	  of	  Failure	  to	  Enforce	  Labor	  Standards	  in	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements,”	  2015.	  76	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  “Labor’s	  So-­‐Called	  ‘Seat	  at	  the	  Table’	  at	  TPP	  Negotiations.”	  77	  Ibid.	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So	  while	  unions	  like	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO	  are	  considered	  a	  significant	  voice	  representing	  US	  labor,	   in	   reality,	   their	   overall	   access	   to	   trade	   negotiations,	   including	   via	   their	  membership	  in	  LAC,	  fails	  to	  yield	  considerable	  influence	  on	  labor	  provisions.	  	   Having	   faced	   barriers	   to	   meaningfully	   participate	   directly	   with	   US	   trade	  policy	   formation,	   labor	   unions,	   civil	   society	   organizations	   (CSOs)	   and	   other	   labor	  advocates	  have	  resigned	  to	  input	  through	  external	  efforts.	  These	  efforts	  resulted	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	   a	  model	   trade	  policy	   through	  bipartisan	   efforts,	   like	   the	  May	  2007	  Bipartisan	  Agreement	  on	  Trade	  Policy	  (May	  10th	  Agreement).	  Like	  all	  policies,	  trade	  representatives,	  government	  officials,	  unions	  and	  CSOs	  conceded	  in	  some	  regard	  in	  order	  to	  come	  to	  agreement;	  but	   labor	  advocates	  have	  criticized	  the	  policy	   for	  not	  going	   far	   enough	   to	   protect	   workers	   rights. 78 	  Recommendations	   for	   a	   new	  framework	  were	  introduced	  almost	  immediately	  following	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  2007	  Policy.79	  	   The	   LAC	   has	   further	   criticized	   application	   of	   the	   May	   10th	   Agreement,	  which	  was	  anticipated	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  “…floor	  for	  standards,	  not	  the	  ceiling.”80	  	   While	  a	  model	  serves	  to	  provide	  a	  basic	  minimum	  standard,	  the	  importance	  of	   participation	   in	   negotiating	   each	   trade	   agreement	   cannot	   be	   understated.	   And	  this	  is	  where	  a	  model	  trade	  policy	  alone	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  Labor	  representatives	  are	  vital	  to	  discussion	  if	  the	  goal	  is	  to	  implement	  effective	  policies.	  Discussions	  need	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  M.	  Angeles	  Villarreal,	  “U.S.-­‐Peru	  Economic	  Relations	  and	  the	  U.S.-­‐Peru	  Trade	  Promotion	  Agreement,”	  Congressional	  Research	  Service:	  Report	  for	  Congress,	  (July	  27,	  2007);	  Travis	  McArthur	  and	  Todd	  Tucker,	  “A	  Year	  after	  Implementation	  of	  Peru	  Free	  Trade	  Agreement,	  U.S.	  and	  Peru	  Left	  with	  Broken	  Promises	  and	  No	  New	  Trade	  Model,”	  Public	  Citizen,	  February	  1,	  2010,	  http://www.citizen.org/documents/PeruFTA-­‐OneYear.pdf;	  Michael	  A.	  Cabin,	  “Labor	  Rights	  in	  the	  Peru	  Agreement:	  Can	  Vague	  Principles	  Yield	  Concrete	  Change?,”	  n.d.	  79	  A	  Way	  Forward	  for	  Workers’	  Rights	  in	  US	  Free	  Trade	  Accords	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  2008).	  80	  The	  Labor	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Trade	  Negotiations	  and	  Trade	  Policy,	  “Report	  on	  the	  Impacts	  of	  the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership,”	  53.	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contextualize	  the	  labor	  standards,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  human	  rights	  impact	  a	  trade	  policy	  will	  have	  across	  industries	  and	  society	  in	  both	  trading	  states.	  	  	   The	  discussion	  thus	  far	  has	  centered	  on	  the	  input,	  or	  lack	  thereof,	  of	  US	  labor	  interests	  into	  the	  negotiation	  process	  but	  has	  not	  yet	  touched	  on	  the	  critical	  voice	  of	  workers	  of	  US	  trading	  partners.	  While	  most	  discussions	  of	  labor	  and	  trade	  end	  with	  its	   influence	  on	  US	  labor	  interests,	   this	  thesis	  emphasizes	  the	  effect	  of	  US	  trade	  on	  labor	  in	  the	  trading	  partner	  countries.	  	   Using	   the	  most	   recent	   negotiation	   process	   of	   the	   TPP	   as	   an	   example,	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   the	   voice	   of	   workers	   of	   US	   trading	   partners	   is	   also	   excluded	   from	  negotiations.	   The	   TPP	   has	   been	   criticized	   along	   the	   same	   lines	   as	   previous	  agreements	  for	  being	  non-­‐transparent,	  non-­‐participatory	  and	  un-­‐democratic.81	  The	  US	  joined	  the	  TPP	  negotiations	  in	  2008,	  and	  the	  text	  of	  the	  trade	  agreement	  was	  not	  released	   for	  public	   reading	  until	  negotiations	  concluded	   in	  November	  2015,	   seven	  years	  later.82	  	  	   Facing	   similar	   impediments	   to	   contribute	   as	   US	   laborers,	   workers	  organizations	   and	   unions	   from	   Australia,	   Canada,	   Japan,	   Malaysia,	   Mexico,	   New	  Zealand,	   Peru,	   Singapore	   and	   the	   US	   drafted	   a	   TPP	   ‘Model	   Labour	   &	   Dispute	  Resolution	  Chapter’	  during	  the	  negotiations	  process	  in	  2012.83	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Alfred	  de	  Zayas,	  et	  al.,	  “UN	  Experts	  Voice	  Concern	  over	  Adverse	  Impact	  of	  Free	  Trade	  and	  Investment	  Agreements	  on	  Human	  Rights,”	  UN	  Human	  Rights	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Commissioner,	  June	  2,	  2015,	  http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16031.	  82	  “Civil	  Society	  Reacts	  to	  Finally-­‐Released	  TPP	  Text,”	  Citizens	  Trade	  Campaign,	  November	  5,	  2015,	  http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/blog/2015/11/05/civil-­‐society-­‐reacts-­‐to-­‐finally-­‐released-­‐tpp-­‐text/.	  83	  “The	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  Agreement	  Model	  Labour	  &	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Chapter”	  (International	  Trade	  Union	  Confederation,	  et	  al.,	  July	  3,	  2012),	  http://www.ituc-­‐csi.org/IMG/pdf/full_ituc_transpacific_partnership_labor_chapter.pdf.	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   The	   President	   of	   the	   Malaysian	   Trades	   Union	   Congress	   (MTUC),	   which	  represents	   800,000	   workers	   across	   Malaysia,	   voiced	   concerns	   with	   the	   TPP	  negotiations	   process.	   Namely	   that	   “…the	   ‘optimism’	   expressed	   by	   government	  leaders	  over	  the	  ability	  to	  settle	  the	  broad	  framework	  of	  trade	  issues	  that	  will	  have	  momentous	   consequences	   for	   the	   ordinary	   citizens	   of	   Malaysia	   was	   bewildering,	  given	   the	   total	  absence	  of	   consultation	  with	  sectors	  of	   the	  population,	  particularly	  workers….”84	  He	  continued	  that	  the	  MTUC	  had	  not	  been	  consulted,	  leaving	  workers	  with	   little	   understanding	   of	   what	   would	   be	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   trade	   deal,	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  workers	  in	  particular	  would	  “…bear	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  (FTAs).”85	  	   In	  Brunei,	  concerns	  go	  beyond	  issues	  of	  participation	  and	  transparency	  in	  the	  policy	  formation	  process	  of	  trade	  agreements.	  Due	  to	  extreme	  restrictions	  of	  human	  rights	   in	   general,	   and	   labor	   rights	   in	  particular,	  Brunei	   has	   only	   one	  union	   that	   is	  active	   in	   the	   country	   representing	   Shell	   Petroleum	   workers	   called	   the	   Brunei	  Oilfield	  Workers	  Union	   (BOWU).	  The	  national	  government	  prohibits	   strikes,	   limits	  free	   speech,	   and	   has	   no	   protections	   for	   collective	   bargaining. 86 	  Hence,	   the	  participation	  of	  Brunei	  workers	  is	  not	  only	  shut	  out	  at	   international	  discussions	  of	  trade	   policies	   but	   are	   exceedingly	   restricted	   domestically	   as	  well.	   Negotiations	   of	  trade	   agreements	   present	   an	   opportunity	   for	   labor	   groups	   in	   the	   trading	   partner	  countries	  to	  be	  consulted;	  yet,	  in	  most	  cases,	  their	  interests	  go	  unrecognized.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Fauwaz	  Abdul	  Aziz,	  “Suhakam	  Urged	  to	  Probe	  Rights	  Impact	  of	  FTAs,”	  Aliran,	  April	  5,	  2012,	  http://aliran.com/civil-­‐society-­‐voices/2012-­‐civil-­‐society-­‐voices/suhakam-­‐urged-­‐to-­‐probe-­‐rights-­‐impact-­‐of-­‐ftas/.	  85	  Ibid.	  86	  “The	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership:	  Four	  Countries	  That	  Don’t	  Comply	  With	  U.S.	  Trade	  Law”	  (American	  Federation	  of	  Labor	  and	  Congress	  of	  Industrial	  Organizations,	  n.d.),	  5,	  http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/150491/3811471/file/TPPreport-­‐NO+BUG.pdf.	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3.2	   The	   Result	   of	   Poor	   Participation:	   Ineffective	   Labor	   Provisions	   in	   US	   Trade	  
Agreements	  The	   results	   of	   a	   non-­‐participatory	   and	   non-­‐transparent	   negotiating	   processes	  become	  evident	  upon	  examination	  of	   the	  evolution	  of	   labor	  provisions	   in	  US	  trade	  agreements	  over	  the	  last	  three	  decades.	  	  	   Since	  NAFTA,	  US	   labor	  provisions	  have	   changed	   in	   scope	  and	   content.	  This	  thesis	   reviews	   three	   fundamental	   textual	   shifts	   in	   the	   way	   labor	   provisions	   have	  developed	   over	   time	   in	   US	   trade	   agreements.	   First,	   labor	   provisions	   have	  moved	  from	  a	  side	  agreement	   to	   the	  main	   text	  of	   the	   trade	  agreement.	  This	   signifies	   that	  labor	   is	   no	   longer	   an	   after-­‐thought;	   rather	   it	   is	   discussed	   during	   the	   negotiations	  along	   with	   other	   aspects	   of	   the	   trade	   policy.	   Second,	   the	   specific	   set	   of	   rights	  included	  has	  changed.	  Rights	  are	  now	  derived	  from	  international	  standards,	  namely	  the	  1998	  ILO	  Declaration	  on	  Fundamental	  Principles	  and	  Rights	  at	  Work	  (1998	  ILO	  Declaration),	   instead	   of	   solely	   from	   domestic	   legislation.	   Third,	   labor	   provisions	  now	   have	   the	   same	   dispute	   settlement	   procedures	   as	   all	   other	   terms	   of	   trade,	  including	  commercial	  disputes.	  	  	   While	  in	  theory,	  these	  three	  textual	  modifications	  all	  sound	  like	  progress,	  the	  effectiveness	   of	   these	   changes	   has	   been	   negligible.	   Employing	   a	   case	   study	   of	   the	  TPP,	   the	   trade	   agreement	   that	   allegedly	   represents	   the	   most	   progressive	   labor	  provisions	  to	  date,	  will	  further	  prove	  this	  contention	  by	  demonstrating	  how	  the	  TPP	  labor	  provisions	  fall	  short	  of	  effective	  and	  meaningful	  change.	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Shift	  1:	  Labor	  Chapter	  Moves	  to	  Main	  Agreement	  While	   moving	   the	   labor	   chapter	   to	   the	   main	   agreement	   is	   a	   step	   in	   the	   right	  direction,	  this	  change	  is	  more	  symbolic	  than	  it	  is	  effective.	  This	  move	  signifies	  that	  the	   discussion	   on	   labor	   takes	   place	   alongside	   traditional	   trade	   issues	   in	   the	  main	  agreement,	  as	  opposed	  to	  on	   the	  side	  or	  after	  as	  was	   the	  case	  with	  NAFTA.	  And	   it	  also	   means	   that	   the	   labor	   chapter	   is	   integral	   to	   the	   trade	   agreement,	   and	   is	  dependent	   upon	   the	   passage	   of	   the	   entire	   accord.	  While	   this	   can	   be	   perceived	   as	  progress,	   the	   mere	   moving	   of	   the	   location	   of	   these	   provisions	   does	   not	   lead	   to	  strengthened	   text	   and	   this	   is	   due	   in	   part	   to	   the	   un-­‐democratic	  method	   that	   trade	  agreements	  are	  negotiated.	  	  	   Moving	   the	   labor	   chapter	   has	   not	   meaningfully	   changed	   the	   negotiation	  process	  to	  a	  more	  inclusive	  or	  consultative	  process.	  Rather,	  the	  process	  continues	  as	  a	  technocratic	  approach	  to	  liberal	  economic	  policy	  formation.	  	  	  	  
Shift	  2:	  Beyond	  Domestic	  Legislation,	  Reference	  to	  International	  Law	  US	   labor	   provisions	   have	   moved	   beyond	   solely	   referencing	   domestic	   labor	   law,	  which	  varied	  in	  relative	  strength	  and	  scope	  by	  country,	  to	  now	  include	  reference	  to	  international	   labor	   standards.	   In	   theory,	   this	   change	   broadens	   protections	   for	  workers	  by	  compensating	  for	  any	  weak	  domestic	  labor	  laws.	  	  	   However,	   the	  use	  of	   international	   standards	  does	  not	  necessarily	  maximize	  effectiveness	   of	   labor	   provisions.	   First,	   the	   1998	   ILO	   Declaration	   is	   problematic	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based	  on	   the	  nature	  of	   the	  declaration.87	  Considering	   it	   the	   “root	   of	   the	  problem,”	  Cabin	   critiques	   the	   use	   of	   the	   ILO	   Declaration	   in	   trade	   agreements	   as	   vague	   and	  ambiguous,	   leading	   to	   problems	   of	   “flexible	   and	   divergent	   interpretations	   of	   the	  ILO’s	  principles	  and	  further	  obscure[ing]	  their	  content”88	  Cabin	  suggests	  that	  while	  the	  declaration	  has	  purpose	  within	  the	  ILO,	   it	   is	  not	  well	  suited	  for	   the	  purpose	  of	  trade	  agreements.	  Second,	  similar	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  ambiguity,	  it	  remains	  unclear	  if	  the	  core	   labor	   standards	   are	   mere	   principles	   or	   if	   they	   are	   in	   fact	   linked	   to	   legally	  binding	  conventions.	  This	  question	  has	  been	  widely	  debated.89	  Third,	  the	  1998	  ILO	  Declaration	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  delinking	  rights	  from	  ratified	  conventions,	  and	  thus	  downgrading	   states	   responsibility	   and	   enforceability.90	  And	   last,	   the	   1998	   ILO	  Declaration	  is	  controversial	  in	  that	  it	  creates	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  rights.	  UN	  efforts	  in	  the	  1990’s	   to	   mainstream	   human	   rights	   and	   advocate	   for	   the	   indivisibility	   and	  interdependence	   of	   the	   full	   spectrum	   of	   rights	   is	   contradicted	   by	   the	   declaration	  limiting	  to	  a	  set	  of	  core	  labor	  standards.91	  This	  prevents	  a	  holistic	  and	  interrelated	  conception	  of	  labor	  rights,	  and	  implicitly	  rejects	  the	  connection	  of	  labor	  standards	  to	  other	  human	  rights	  principles	   like	   the	  right	   to	  a	  decent	  wage,	   food,	  health,	  among	  many	   others.	   These	   arguments	   show	   that	   the	   incorporation	   of	   international	   legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Philip	  Alston,	  “‘Core	  Labour	  Standards’	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  the	  International	  Labour	  Rights	  Regime,”	  European	  Journal	  of	  International	  Law	  15,	  no.	  3	  (2004):	  457–521;	  Cabin,	  “Labor	  Rights	  in	  the	  Peru	  Agreement:	  Can	  Vague	  Principles	  Yield	  Concrete	  Change?”	  88	  Michael	  A.	  Cabin,	  “Labor	  Rights	  in	  the	  Peru	  Agreement:	  Can	  Vague	  Principles	  Yield	  Concrete	  Change?,”	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  109,	  no.	  5	  (June	  1,	  2009):	  1047–93.	  89	  Ibid.	  90	  Alston,	  “‘Core	  Labour	  Standards’	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  the	  International	  Labour	  Rights	  Regime.”	  91	  Jean-­‐Philippe	  Thérien	  and	  Philippe	  Joly,	  “‘	  All	  Human	  Rights	  for	  All’:	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  Human	  Rights	  in	  the	  Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era,”	  Human	  Rights	  Quarterly	  36,	  no.	  2	  (2014):	  373–96.	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standards	   do	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   the	   labor	   provisions	   will	   become	   more	  effective.	  	  
Shift	  3:	  Dispute	  Settlements	  In	  cases	  where	  labor	  standards	  have	  been	  violated,	  US	  labor	  provisions	  now	  utilize	  the	   same	   dispute	   settlement	   procedures	   as	   other	   aspects	   of	   trade,	   such	   as	  intellectual	  property	   rights	  and	  other	  commercial	   issues.	  Further,	   the	  set	  of	   rights	  that	   can	   be	   taken	   to	   dispute	   settlement	   has	   also	   progressed.	  With	  NAFTA,	   only	   a	  limited	   set	   of	   rights	   could	   go	   so	   far	   as	   dispute	   settlement.	   Now,	   any	   labor	   right	  covered	   under	   a	   given	   agreements	   labor	   provisions	   can	   be	   heard	   in	   dispute	  settlement	  proceedings.	  	  	   While	  this	  may	  be	  perceived	  as	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  advancing	   labor	  rights,	   it	  does	  not	  guarantee	   that	   labor	  provisions	  are	  now	  better	  enforced.	   While	   a	   possibility	   may	   exist	   to	   bring	   a	   case,	   this	   does	   not	   lead	   to	  automatic	   acceptance	   of	   a	   case	   for	   review	   or	   to	   successful	   enforcement	   of	   labor	  standards.	   The	   record	   of	   cases	   brought	   through	   trade	   agreements	   remains	   quite	  low.92	  A	  total	  of	  seven	  submissions	  have	  been	  filed	  across	  all	  US	  trade	  agreements,	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   NAFTA.93	  Under	   NAFTA's	   labor	   side	   agreement,	   the	   North	  American	   Agreement	   on	   Labor	   Cooperation,	   a	   total	   of	   39	   submissions	   have	   been	  filed. 94 	  Overall,	   only	   one	   submission,	   Guatemala,	   has	   been	   taken	   to	   dispute	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  “Submissions	  under	  the	  Labor	  Provisions	  of	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements,”	  US	  Department	  of	  Labor:	  
Burea	  of	  International	  Labor	  Affairs,	  accessed	  August	  8,	  2015,	  http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/fta-­‐subs.htm.	  93	  Ibid.	  94	  “Submissions	  under	  the	  North	  American	  Agreement	  on	  Labor	  Cooperation	  (NAALC),”	  US	  
Department	  of	  Labor,	  Bureau	  of	  International	  Labor	  Affairs,	  August	  9,	  2015,	  http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/naalc.htm#.	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settlement.	   The	   lack	   of	   accessibility	   and	   other	   practical	   barriers	   to	   dispute	  settlement	  mechanisms	  for	  workers	  claiming	  rights	  violations	  and	  seeking	  redress	  represent	  major	  challenges	  that	  most	  workers	  are	  unable	  to	  overcome.	  	  
3.3	  Case	  Study:	  TPP	  Labor	  Provisions	  	  The	  last	  section	  analyzed	  three	  fundamental	  shifts	  in	  the	  ways	  US	  labor	  provisions	  have	  been	  approached	  over	  time.	  The	  most	  recent	  US	  trade	  agreement,	   the	  Trans-­‐Pacific	   Partnership,	   has	   been	   heralded	   by	   the	   Obama	   Administration	   as	  unprecedented.	   Specifically,	   on	   the	  White	  House	  website,	   President	  Obama	   claims	  that,	   “[u]nder	   the	   TPP,	   tough,	   fully-­‐enforceable	   standards	   will	   protect	   workers’	  rights…	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history.”95	  This	  enthusiasm	  is	  misguided.	  While	  the	  TPP	  includes	  new	  elements,	  analysis	  of	   its	   labor	  provisions	  ultimately	  point	  to	  a	  repeat	  of	  previous	  errors.	  The	  lack	  of	  participation	  in	  the	  negotiating	  process	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  high	  probability	  of	  ineffective	  labor	  provisions	  affecting	  both	  US	  labor	  and	  labor	  abroad.	  	   The	   recently	   released	   text	   of	   the	   TPP	   reveals	   elements	   within	   the	   labor	  chapter	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  this	  agreement.	  First,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  core	  labor	  rights	  as	   outlined	   in	   the	   1998	   ILO	   Declaration,	   the	   TPP	   also	   states	   that	   countries	   must	  adopt	   and	   maintain	   “…acceptable	   conditions	   of	   work	   with	   respect	   to	   minimum	  wages,	  hours	  or	  work,	  and	  occupational	  safety	  and	  health.”96	  Unlike	  the	  core	   labor	  standards,	   this	  new	  element	   is	  not	   linked	   to	   international	   standards,	   a	   fact	   that	   is	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  “The	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership:	  What	  You	  Need	  to	  Know	  about	  President	  Obama’s	  Trade	  Agreement,”	  The	  White	  House,	  accessed	  November	  5,	  2015,	  https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/economy/trade.	  96	  “Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership,”	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative,	  November	  2015,	  19–2,	  https://ustr.gov/trade-­‐agreements/free-­‐trade-­‐agreements/trans-­‐pacific-­‐partnership/tpp-­‐full-­‐text.	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explicitly	   stated	   in	   a	   footnote	   in	   the	   agreement.	   While	   this	   may	   be	   perceived	   as	  solving	   the	   issues	   previously	   identified	   about	   the	   ambiguous	   nature	   of	   the	  international	   legal	   standards,	   it	   creates	   additional	   problems	   for	   labor.	   Instead	   of	  uniform,	  unambiguous	  and	  effective	  labor	  standards	  that	  would	  adequately	  address	  previous	   criticism,	   the	   TPP	   depends	   on	   the	   domestic	   legislation	   of	   the	   involved	  trading	  patterns.	  National	  laws	  vary	  in	  scope	  and	  content,	  showing	  that	  the	  relevant	  labor	   standards	  will	   significantly	   differ	   among	   the	   trading	   partner	   countries.	   This	  variance	   in	   domestic	   legislation	  will	   correspond	   to	   differing	   levels	   of	   respect	   and	  protection	   of	   labor	   standards	   among	   trading	   partners.	   Such	   variance	   calls	   into	  question	  the	  overall	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  labor	  provision	  in	  the	  TPP.	  	   Second,	   according	   to	   Article	   19.6	   of	   the	   TPP,	   “…each	   Party	   shall	   also	  
discourage,	   through	  initiatives	   it	  considers	  appropriate,	   the	  importation	  of	  goods…	  produced…	  by	   forced	  or	   compulsory	   labour,	   including	   forced	  or	   compulsory	   child	  labour”	   (emphasis	   added).97	  The	  use	  of	   the	  word	   ‘discourage’	   results	   in	  more	  of	   a	  symbolic	   gesture	   than	   a	  meaningful	   effort	   toward	   elimination	   of	   child	   and	   forced	  labor.	  Instead	  of	  ‘discourage,’	  trading	  partners	  could	  have	  phrased	  the	  provision	  by	  stating	   that	   trading	   partners	   are	   ‘barred,’	   ‘prevented’	   or	   ’prohibited’	   from	   using	  forced	  or	   child	   labor.	  The	   fact	   that	   such	   terms	  were	  not	   chosen	   signals	   to	   trading	  partners	   that	   the	   provision	   is	   not	   meaningful.	   Further,	   a	   vague	   word	   like	  ‘discourage’	   calls	   into	   question	   the	   enforceability	   of	   such	   a	   provision.	   States	   can	  easily	  argue	  that	  they	  discouraged	  child	  and	  forced	  labor,	  without	  taking	  significant	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action.	  The	  text	   lacks	   indicators	  and	  methods	  of	  monitoring	  this	  provision,	   further	  limiting	  its	  enforceability.	  	   Third,	   according	   to	   Article	   19.4,	   “The	   Parties	   recognise	   that	   it	   is	  inappropriate	   to	   encourage	   trade	   or	   investment	   by	   weakening	   or	   reducing	   the	  protections	  afforded	  in	  each	  Party’s	   labour	   laws.	  Accordingly,	  no	  Party	  shall	  waive	  or	   otherwise	   derogate	   from,	   its	   statutes	   or	   regulations…	   in	   a	   manner	   affecting	  trade…	   between	   the	   Parties.”98	  On	   its	   face,	   this	   provision	   appears	   to	   address	   a	  weakness	  present	  in	  previous	  trade	  agreements.	  In	  the	  past,	  developing	  nations	  set	  up	  ‘export	  processing	  zones’,	  where	  domestic	  laws,	  including	  those	  related	  to	  labor	  standards,	  did	  not	  apply.	  Developing	  countries	  believe	  that	  such	  zones	  would	  attract	  additional	   trade.	  Explicitly	   stating	   that	  nations	  are	  prohibited	   from	  “weakening	  or	  reducing	  the	  [labor]	  protections”	  would	  seem	  to	  address	  this	  previous	  issue.	  	  	   However,	   like	   with	   other	   sections	   of	   the	   TPP,	   this	   provision	   is	   limited	   to	  areas	  “affecting	  trade…	  between	  the	  Parties.”	  This	  adds	  an	  unnecessary	  element	  of	  complexity.	  The	  burden	  is	  now	  placed	  on	  workers	  to	  not	  only	  prove	  that	  their	  labor	  rights	  were	  violated,	  but	  also	  that	  their	  work	  was	  related	  to	  international	  trade.	  This	  leaves	   open	   substantial	   room	   for	   exploitation.	   Just	   as	   businesses	   previously	  manipulated	   export	   processing	   zones,	   this	   provision	  may	   lead	   business	   to	   set	   up	  activity	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  complex	  manner	  so	  as	  to	  minimize	  the	  link	  between	  specific	  sites	  of	  production	  and	  trade.	  This	  adds	  an	  unnecessary	  burden	  on	  workers	  to	  prove	  that	  labor	  violations	  occurred	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  trade	  and	  so	  violations	  of	  labor	  standards	  may	  remain	  unaddressed.	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  Ibid.,	  19–3.	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   Fourth,	  while	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   has	  been	  briefly	  mentioned	   in	  the	  annex	  of	  previous	  agreements,	  it	  was	  featured	  more	  prominently	  in	  the	  TPP	  in	  a	  stand-­‐alone	   article	   within	   the	  main	   labor	   chapter.	   The	   text	   merely	   “…encourages	  enterprises	   to	   voluntarily	   adopt	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   initiatives…”99	  Similar	   to	   the	   use	   of	   the	   word	   “discourage”	   above,	   this	   provision	   simply	  “encourages”	  enterprises	  to	  “voluntarily”	  adopt	  initiatives.	  This	  vague	  language	  does	  not	  obligate	  actors	  to	  enforce	  labor	  rights.	  So	  even	  though	  this	  represents	  one	  of	  the	  first	   times	   the	   responsibilities	   of	   business	   is	   explicitly	   mentioned	   in	   the	   labor	  chapter,	   the	  weak	   language	  mitigates	   the	  responsibility	  of	  business	   to	  respect	  and	  protect	  labor	  standards.	  	   And	   finally,	   labor	   side	   agreements	   have	   been	   agreed	   upon	   with	   Malaysia,	  Brunei	   and	   Vietnam.100	  The	   side-­‐agreements	   intend	   to	   serve	   as	   implementation	  plans	   to	   ensure	   legal,	   institutional	   and	   social	   reform.	   Each	   of	   the	   plans	   varies	   in	  scope	  and	  strength.	  The	  Vietnam	  side	  agreement	  is	  the	  most	  detailed	  in	  scope	  and	  on	  its	  face,	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  most	  encompassing	  of	  labor	  standards.	  However,	  this	  side	  agreement	  remains	  ineffective	  and	  again	  shows	  how	  the	  main	  actors	  involved	  in	  trade	  negotiations	  ultimately	  devalue	  labor	  standards.	  	  	   Specifically,	  this	  side	  agreement	  grants	  a	  five-­‐year	  extension	  from	  the	  signing	  of	   the	   TPP	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   core	   labor	   standard	   of	   allowing	  workers	   to	   freely	  establish	   and	   join	   labor	   unions	   of	   their	   choosing.101	  During	   this	   time	   period,	   the	  enforceability	   through	   consultation	  or	  dispute	   settlement	   is	   therefore	   inaccessible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Ibid.,	  19–4.	  100	  “TPP.”	  101	  US-­‐Vietnam	  Plan	  for	  Enforcement	  of	  Trade	  and	  Labor	  Relations	  (Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  2015).	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to	   Vietnamese	  workers	   who	  wish	   to	   join	   a	   labor	   union.	   Ironically,	   this	   derogates	  from	   Article	   19.4	   of	   the	   TPP,	  which	   states	   that	   it	   is	   inappropriate	   to	  waive	   labor	  rights	  inconsistent	  with	  those	  outlined	  within	  the	  labor	  chapter.102	  	  	   Granting	   a	   five-­‐year	   window	   to	   comply	   with	   this	   provision	   may	   seem	  reasonable	   given	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   reform	   domestic	   legislation	   and	   procedures	  regarding	   labor	   unions.	  However,	   other	   options	   existed	   that	   both	   parties	   ignored.	  First,	  negotiations	  of	  the	  TPP	  began	  seven	  years	  ago.	  At	  this	  time,	  parties	  could	  have	  insisted	  that	  labor	  provisions	  represented	  a	  non-­‐negotiable	  aspect	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	   that	   the	   expectation	  was	   that	   interested	   parties	  would	   begin	   preparing	   their	  domestic	  institutions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Vietnam,	  this	  would	  include	  the	  needed	  reforms	  to	   ensure	   that	   labor	   unions	   could	   be	   established	   and	   freely	   joined.	   Alternatively,	  parties	  could	  agree	  now	  to	  the	  agreement,	  but	  only	  begin	   its	   implementation	  once	  all	  partners,	   including	  Vietnam,	  had	   the	  necessary	  domestic	   infrastructure	  needed	  to	   comply	   with	   the	   labor	   provisions.	   Instead,	   the	   parties	   prioritized	   economic	  interests	  over	  human	  rights,	  facilitating	  up	  to	  five	  years	  of	  derogation	  from	  this	  core	  labor	  standard.	  	   Following	  publication	  of	  the	  labor	  chapter	  of	  the	  TPP,	  the	  International	  Trade	  Union	  Confederation	  (ITUC),	  one	  of	   the	  worker	  organizations	  that	  drafted	  the	  TPP	  ‘Model	  Labour	  &	  Dispute	  Resolution	  Chapter’	  mentioned	  above,	  indicated	  that	  trade	  unions	  were	  not	  appeased	  by	  minor	  concessions	  in	  the	  labor	  chapter.	  Instead,	  they	  are	   “deeply	   disappointed”	   that	   the	   labor	   chapter	   failed	   to	   include	   a	   number	   of	  “critical	  amendments”	  proposed	  in	  the	  model	  labor	  chapter,	  which	  include:	  no	  direct	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  “TPP,”	  19–3.	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reference	   to	   ILO	   Conventions;	   dispute	   settlement	   continues	   to	   rely	   on	   state-­‐state	  discretion	  and	  prolonged	  timelines;	  and	  protections	  for	  migrant	  workers	  were	  not	  enhanced.103	  	   It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  negotiation	  of	  US	  trade	  agreements	  is	  not	  participatory	  nor	  is	   it	   transparent.	   Despite	   the	   impact	   of	   agreements	   on	   workers,	   the	   approach	   to	  draft	   trade	   continues	   top-­‐down	  without	   the	   voice	   of	  workers.	  Workers,	   in	   the	  US	  and	  abroad,	  are	  not	  represented	  in	  the	  drafting	  of	  US	  trade	  agreements.	  While	  these	  actors	   have	   made	   efforts	   to	   contribute	   in	   innovative	   ways	   such	   as	   model	  agreements,	  efforts	  have	  not	  been	  meaningfully	  incorporated,	  as	  is	  evidenced	  in	  the	  final	   text	  of	   agreements.	  The	   significant	   adverse	   impacts	   from	  a	  non-­‐participatory	  process	   in	   formulating	   trade	  agreements	  will	   impact	   the	  outcomes	  of	   the	  policies.	  	  The	  following	  section	  will	  analyze	  how	  effective	   labor	  provisions	  are	  at	  promoting	  labor	  rights.	  	  
	  
4.	  ASSESSING	  IMPLEMENTATION	  OF	  CORE	  LABOR	  STANDARDS	  	  
	  The	  previous	  section	  argued	  that	  poor	  participation	  by	  labor	  has	  led	  to	  the	  inclusion	  of	   ineffective	   labor	   provisions	   in	   trade	   agreements.	   By	   using	   textual	   analysis,	   it	  became	   clear	   that	   the	   labor	   provisions	  were	   unlikely	   to	   be	   effective.	   This	   section	  goes	   further	   than	   the	   textual	   level	   and	   analyzes	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	  provisions,	  ultimately	  showing	  that	  they	  have	  been	  ineffective	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  “Fears	  Over	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  Confirmed,”	  International	  Trade	  Union	  Confederation,	  November	  10,	  2015,	  http://www.ituc-­‐csi.org/fears-­‐over-­‐trans-­‐pacific.	  
	   37	  
	   An	  explicit	  objective	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  based	  approach	   is	   the	  realization	  of	  human	   rights	   as	   well	   as	   the	   respect	   for	   rights	   as	   central	   to	   the	   process	   of	  implementing	   policies.	   As	   such,	   this	   section	   will	   analyze	   the	   process	   of	  implementation	   and	   monitoring	   of	   core	   labor	   standards	   outlined	   in	   the	   labor	  provisions	  of	  trade	  agreements	  in	  select	  US	  trading	  states.	  In	  line	  with	  the	  previous	  section,	  this	  analysis	  will	  show	  how	  trade	  agreements	  fall	  short	  of	  yielding	  the	  full	  implementation	  of	  labor	  standards.	  	  	   Criticism	   abounds	   regarding	   the	   failure	   to	   implement	   labor	   standards	   in	  trade	  agreements.	  US	  Senator	  Elizabeth	  Warren,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  outspoken	  critics	  in	  Congress	   of	   the	   recent	   trade	   negotiations	   of	   the	   Trans-­‐Pacific	   Partnership	   (TPP),	  published	  a	  2015	  report	  on	  US	  Trade	  Agreements	  titled	  “Broken	  Promises:	  Decades	  of	  Failure	   to	  Enforce	  Labor	  Standards	   in	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements.”104	  In	   the	  report,	  she	  highlights	  how,	   like	  a	  broken	   record,	   virtually	   all	  US	  Presidents	  and	  US	  Trade	  Representatives	   have	   made	   claims	   that	   the	   FTA	   under	   negotiation	   is	   the	   most	  progressive,	   including	  the	  strongest	  labor	  provisions	  yet	  to	  protect	  workers	  rights.	  Despite	  such	  rhetoric,	  Warren’s	  report	  finds	  that	  “the	  United	  States	  repeatedly	  fails	  to	   enforce	   or	   adopts	   unenforceable	   labor	   standards	   in	   free	   trade	   agreements.”105	  Warren,	  joined	  by	  several	  human	  rights	  organizations	  and	  other	  actors,	  insists	  that	  US	   trade	   agreements	   have	   a	   long	  way	   to	   go	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   realization	   of	  labor	  standards	  both	  in	  the	  US	  and	  its	  trading	  partners.	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  Prepared	  by	  the	  Staff	  of	  Senator	  Elizabeth	  Warren,	  “Broken	  Promises:	  Decades	  of	  Failure	  to	  Enforce	  Labor	  Standards	  in	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements.”	  105	  Ibid.	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   In	   order	   to	   evaluate	   such	   criticism,	   considerable	   research	   was	   analyzed	  concerning	   the	   implementation	   of	   trade	   agreements.	   Such	   research	   includes	   a	  number	  of	  US	  governmental	  reports	  administered	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trade	  Representative,	  US	  Department	  of	  Labor,	  the	  US	  Department	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Government	  Accountability	  Office	   (GAO).	  While	   this	   research	   is	   comprehensive	   in	  nature,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  point	  out	   that	   a	  GAO	  report	   released	   in	  November	  2014	  found	   that	   the	   USTR	   and	   DOL	   lack	   a	   systematic	   approach	   to	   monitoring	   and	  enforcing	  labor	  provisions	  in	  trade	  agreements.106	  While	  this	  is	  reflective	  of	  the	  US	  Government’s	  overall	  approach	  to	  labor	  provisions,	  it	  also	  represents	  a	  weakness	  in	  research.	  As	  such,	  these	  reports	  are	  augmented	  with	  research	  conducted	  by	  outside	  groups	  including	  human	  rights	  organizations.107	  
	  
4.1	  Impact	  of	  Labor	  Provisions	  on	  Legal	  Reform	  Following	   passage	   of	   the	   2007	   Trade	   Policy	   Template,	   the	   standard	   requirement	  made	  by	  the	  US	   in	  recent	  agreements	   is	   that	  trading	  partners	  must	  align	  domestic	  labor	   law	   with	   the	   ILO	   core	   labor	   standards,	   more	   specifically	   the	   1998	   ILO	  Declaration.108	  As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  use	  of	  such	  international	  standards	  can	  often	  present	  additional	  obstacles,	  as	  vague	  obligations	  often	  give	  room	  for	  states	  to	  obfuscate	  their	  responsibilities.	  	   At	   the	   beginning	   stages	   of	   trade	   negotiations,	   the	   United	   States	   always	  identifies	  its	  commercial	  interests.	  This	  sharply	  contrasts	  with	  assessments	  of	  labor	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  “Free	  Trade	  Agreements:	  U.S.	  Partners	  Are	  Addressing	  Labor	  Commitments,	  but	  More	  Monitoring	  and	  Enforcement	  Are	  Needed”	  (U.S.	  Government	  Accountability	  Office,	  November	  6,	  2014).	  107	  A	  Way	  Forward	  for	  Workers’	  Rights	  in	  US	  Free	  Trade	  Accords.	  108	  Labour:	  Chapter	  Summary	  (Trans-­‐Pacific	  Parnternship	  2015).	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standards	  in	  trading	  partner	  countries.109	  Unlike	  with	  commercial	   interests,	  the	  US	  has	   not	   made	   it	   common	   practice	   to	   address	   insufficiencies	   in	   the	   core	   labor	  standards	   within	   the	   legal	   framework	   of	   its	   trading	   partners	   in	   advance	   of	  submitting	  the	  trade	  agreement	  to	  Congress	  for	  approval.	  110	  	  
	   More	  commonly,	  efforts	  to	  correct	  labor	  deficiencies	  take	  place	  either	  shortly	  before	  the	  trade	  agreement	  concludes	  or	  after	   it	  has	  already	  been	  enacted.111	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  form	  the	  previous	  section	  describing	  the	  TPP	  side	  agreement	  between	  the	  US	  and	  Vietnam.	  This	  agreement	  is	  an	  example	  of	  addressing	  labor	  deficiencies	  after	  the	  agreement	  is	  enacted.	  Specifically,	  it	  grants	  Vietnam	  five	  years	  to	  change	  its	  domestic	  infrastructure	  to	  allow	  for	  workers	  to	  establish	  and	  join	  labor	  unions.112	  	  	   While	  the	  example	  of	  the	  side	  agreement	  with	  Vietnam	  points	  to	  an	  instance	  where	   labor	   deficiencies	   are	   only	   addressed	   after	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   trade	  agreement,	   the	   US-­‐Peru	   trade	   agreement	   required	   labor	   deficiencies	   to	   be	  addressed	   prior	   to	   its	   enactment.	   But	   despite	   this	   difference,	   efforts	   were	  inadequate	  to	  address	  labor	  deficiencies	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Peru,	   the	   US	   Congress	   insisted	   that	   labor	   deficiencies	   be	  addressed	  before	  the	  trade	  agreement	  was	  approved.	  But	  because	  the	  evaluation	  of	  labor	  standards	  in	  trading	  partner	  countries	  was	  not	  taken	  seriously	  from	  the	  onset	  of	  negotiations,	  Congress’	  insistence	  lead	  to	  a	  rush	  by	  Peru’s	  Government	  to	  amend	  domestic	   statues,	   as	   opposed	   to	   thorough	   and	   thoughtful	   solutions.	   Specifically,	  “Peru	  issued	  piecemeal,	  controversial	  labor-­‐related	  executive	  decrees	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  A	  Way	  Forward	  for	  Workers’	  Rights	  in	  US	  Free	  Trade	  Accords,	  13–14.	  110	  Ibid.	  111	  Ibid.	  112	  US-­‐Vietnam	  Plan	  for	  Enforcement	  of	  Trade	  and	  Labor	  Relations	  (Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership	  2015).	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congressional	  consideration	  of	  the	  US-­‐Peru	  agreement,	  in	  lieu	  of	  more	  effective	  and	  comprehensive	  but	  time-­‐intensive	  labor	  law	  reforms.”113	  The	  haphazard	  plan	  failed	  to	  show	  a	  commitment	  to	  meaningful	  reform	  of	  complex	  labor	  standards.	  	  	   Whether	  labor	  standards	  in	  trade	  partner	  countries	  are	  addressed	  prior	  to	  or	  after	   the	   enactment	   of	   a	   trade	   agreement,	   it	   cannot	   be	   denied	   that	   such	   a	   system	  means	  that	   labor	  standards	  are	  often	  addressed	  after	  the	  economic	  considerations	  have	  already	  been	  finalized.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Vietnam,	  the	  economic	  benefits	  of	  the	  TPP	  will	  be	  determined	  long	  before	  the	  country	  changes	  domestic	  policy	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  establishment	   of	   trade	   unions.	   As	   such,	   the	   available	   incentives	   present	   at	   trade	  negotiations	   are	  not	   available	   to	  be	  used	   as	   a	  means	   to	  promote	  better	   and	  more	  comprehensive	  reform	  in	  Vietnam.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Peru,	  the	  “quick-­‐fix”	  labor	  reforms	  were	   sufficient	   to	   persuade	   the	   US	   Congress	   to	   approve	   of	   the	   agreement.	   Any	  needed	  amendments	  and	  other	  changes	  to	  these	  new	  policies,	  which	  were	  probably	  large	  in	  number	  given	  the	  quick	  process	  by	  which	  the	  initial	  reforms	  were	  enacted	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  were	  also	  isolated	  from	  the	  trade	  negotiations	  process.114	  In	  both	  cases,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   economic	   incentive	   had	   already	   been	   realized	  meant	   that	  states	  had	  little	  incentive	  to	  undergo	  serious	  labor	  reform.	  	   While	   the	   above	   analysis	   points	   to	   vast	   room	   for	   improvement,	   it	   is	  important	  to	  point	  out	  that	  this	  policy	  has	  had	  a	  marked	  impact	  on	  legal	  reform	  in	  the	   domestic	   legislation	   of	   some	   US	   trading	   partners.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   Oman	   and	  Colombia,	   both	   countries	   worked	   to	   reform	   their	   labor	   laws	   ahead	   of	   trade	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  A	  Way	  Forward	  for	  Workers’	  Rights	  in	  US	  Free	  Trade	  Accords,	  14.	  114	  Ibid.,	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discussions	   out	   of	   a	   desire	   to	   enter	   into	   a	   trade	   agreement	  with	   the	   US.115	  Select	  countries	   have	   continued	   to	   strengthen	   legal	   statutes	   after	   the	   passage	   of	   a	   trade	  agreement,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Jordan.116	  	   Despite	   these	   few	   successes,	   most	   trading	   partner	   countries	   underwent	  institutional	  reform	  after	  the	  trade	  agreement	  had	  been	  finalized.	  As	  will	  be	  argued	  in	   the	  next	  section,	   this	  did	  not	  necessarily	  result	   in	   improved	   labor	  standards	   for	  workers.	  	  
4.2	  Trade	  and	  Institutional	  Reform	  The	  labor	  provisions	  of	  trade	  agreements	  often	  result	  in	  institutional	  reform	  in	  the	  trading	  partner	  countries.	  As	  part	  of	  trade	  agreements,	  the	  US	  provides	  funding	  and	  technical	   guidance	   for	   institutional	   capacity	  building	  efforts.	  The	  objective	  of	   such	  institutional	  reform	  is	  to	  improve	  labor	  law	  enforcement.117	  	  	   The	  US	   is	   engaged	  with	   and	   funding	   programs	   to	   improve	   labor	   standards	  with	  select	  trading	  partners,	  including	  Jordan,	  Chile,	  Morocco,	  Guatemala,	  Honduras,	  Panama,	   Oman,	   Colombia	   and	   Peru.118	  The	   USTR	   and	   DOL	   cite	   limited	   funds	   as	  justification	  for	  selecting	  these	  priority	  countries	  to	  monitor	  compliance	  with	  labor	  provisions.119	  	  	   Trade	  agreements	  with	  Panama,	  Peru,	  Jordan	  and	  Morocco	  each	  require	  the	  creation	   of	   labor	   councils	   or	   committees	   consisting	   of	   high-­‐level	   government	  representatives	  from	  each	  trading	  partner.	  Councils	  typically	  hold	  meetings	  annually	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  “Free	  Trade	  Agreements:	  U.S.	  Partners	  Are	  Addressing	  Labor	  Commitments,	  but	  More	  Monitoring	  and	  Enforcement	  Are	  Needed.”	  116	  Ibid.	  117	  Ibid.	  118	  Ibid.	  119	  Ibid.	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or	  bi-­‐annually	  to	  discuss	  labor	  issues	  in	  terms	  of	  institutional	  capacity,	  policy	  reform	  and	  to	  review	  labor	  obligations	  within	  the	  trade	  agreement.120	  	   In	  Jordan,	  Peru	  and	  Panama,	  the	  Labor	  Councils	  have	  held	  meetings	  open	  to	  public,	  and	  included	  interaction	  with	  stakeholders	  beyond	  the	  government	  officials	  who	  represent	   the	   councils.121	  In	  other	   instances,	   such	  as	   in	   Jordan	  and	  Colombia,	  Labor	  Action	  Plans	  (LAPs)	  have	  been	  established.	  LAPs	  and	  Labor	  Councils	  have	  the	  added	  value	  of	  being	  contextual	  and	  thus	  address	  critical	  labor	  issues	  specific	  to	  the	  relevant	   trading	   country.	   In	   Jordan,	   the	   LAP	   focuses	   on	   labor	   issues	   of	   foreign	  workers.122	  The	  Governments	  of	   the	  US	  and	  Colombia	  continue	   their	   collaboration	  to	  implement	  the	  2011	  Colombian	  Action	  Plan	  Related	  to	  Labor	  Rights	  that	  includes	  a	   project	   to	   increase	   accountability	   of	   perpetrators	   who	   commit	   violence	   against	  unions.123	  	   After	  reviewing	  the	  legal	  and	  institutional	  reforms	  that	  result	  from	  the	  labor	  provisions	  of	   trade	  agreements,	   one	   could	   easily	  be	   convinced	   that	   the	  US	  and	   its	  trading	   partners	   are	   doing	   their	   due	   diligence.	   However,	   the	   critical	   measure	   of	  effectiveness	   is	   the	   implementation	   of	   these	   legal	   and	   institutional	   reforms	   in	   the	  lives	   of	   workers.	   While	   the	   first	   two	   measures	   support	   the	   third,	   they	   do	   not	  automatically	  result	   in	  improvements	  to	  working	  conditions.	  The	  following	  section	  will	  look	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  legal	  and	  institutional	  reform	  on	  workers	  rights.	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  Michael	  B.G.	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  Trade	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  Agenda	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  Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Unites	  States	  on	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  Trade	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4.3	  The	  Impact	  of	  Legal	  and	  Institutional	  Reforms	  on	  Labor	  The	  GAO	  reviewed	  the	   implementation	  of	   labor	  commitments	   in	  trade	  agreements	  and	  concluded	  that,	  “[s]takeholders	  reported	  limited	  enforcement	  capacity	  and	  gaps	  in	  labor	  rights…”124	  	  	   While	   in	  some	  cases	   institutional	  reform	  resulted	  from	  the	  labor	  provisions	  of	  trade	  agreements,	  improvements	  in	  the	  realization	  of	  labor	  rights	  did	  not	  always	  result.	   The	   GAO	   reviewed	   documents	   and	   interviewed	   unions	   and	   other	   non-­‐governmental	  stakeholders.	  According	  to	  their	  research,	  these	  groups	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  Guatemala,	   Colombia	   and	   Peru	   all	   voiced	   an	   inability	   to	   benefit	   from	   legal	   rights	  within	  their	  respective	  labor	  laws.	  125	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Oman,	  domestic	  workers	  found	  that	  labor	  laws	  were	  respected;	  however,	  foreign	  workers	  did	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  labor	  laws,	  suggesting	  that	  implementation	  of	  labor	  law	  is	  discriminatory.126	  	   This	   trend	   continued	   in	   other	   trading	   partner	   countries.	   For	   example,	  stakeholders	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   Colombia	   and	   Guatemala	   did	   not	   find	   that	   efforts	   to	  improve	   capacities	   and	   efficiency	   of	   labor	   inspectorate	   or	   court	   processes	   were	  effective.127	  	  	   Specifically,	   in	   El	   Salvador,	   courts	   significantly	   improved	   the	   timeline	   for	  accepting	   labor	  cases,	   from	  two	  years	   to	  six	  months.	  Nevertheless,	  court	  decisions	  have	   not	   been	   enforced	   in	   fifty	   once	   percent	   of	   court	   sentences.128	  In	   Guatemala,	  union	  leaders	  were	  paid	  to	  leave	  their	  jobs	  and	  to	  discourage	  unionization.	  In	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	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instances,	   union	   workers	   were	   fired.129 	  And	   in	   Peru,	   the	   practice	   of	   informal	  contracting	  has	  led	  to	  fear	  to	  exercise	  ones	  rights	  to	  freedom	  of	  association	  and	  to	  collective	  bargaining.130	  	   The	   International	   Trade	   Union	   Confederation	   (ITUC)	   confirmed	   this	   stark	  evidence	  presented	  by	  the	  GAO.	  For	  over	  thirty	  years,	  the	  ITUC	  has	  collected	  data	  on	  the	  rights	  violations	  of	  trade	  unions	  around	  the	  world.	  In	  its	  2015	  publication	  of	  the	  Global	  Rights	  Index,	  Colombia	  and	  Guatemala	  ranked	  in	  the	  ten	  worst	  countries	  for	  working	  condition	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  report	  highlighted	  in	  both	  countries	  the	  issue	  of	  murder	   of	   union	  workers	   attempting	   to	   bargain	   for	   better	  working	   conditions.	   In	  Colombia,	   22	   union	  workers	  were	  murdered	   in	   this	   country	   alone.131	  While	   labor	  provisions	   in	  US	   trade	   agreements	  with	   these	   countries	   specifically	   promote	   core	  labor	  standards,	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  establish	  and	  freely	   join	  unions,	  this	  evidence	  shows	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  such	  provisions	  is	  significantly	  lacking.	  	   The	  ITUC	  points	  to	  the	  murder	  of	  union	  workers	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  lack	  of	  respect	  by	  the	  Colombian	  Government	  of	  the	  right	  to	  freely	  join	  unions.	  While	  the	  US	  references	  this	  right	  in	  most	  trade	  agreements,	  including	  most	  recently	  in	  the	  TPP,	  the	  enforcement	  of	  this	  provision	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  seriousness	  by	  the	  US	  towards	  ensuring	  this	  obligation	  is	  fulfilled	  by	  trade	  partner	  countries.	  For	  example,	  testifying	  to	  the	  US	  Senate	  Finance	  Committee	  about	  the	  TPP,	  Richard	  Trumka,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO,	  said	  that	  the	  General	  Counsel	  of	  the	  USTR	  had	  personally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  “Free	  Trade	  Agreements:	  U.S.	  Partners	  Are	  Addressing	  Labor	  Commitments,	  but	  More	  Monitoring	  and	  Enforcement	  Are	  Needed.”	  130	  Ibid.	  131	  “ITUC	  Global	  Rights	  Index	  Names	  World’s	  Ten	  Worst	  Countries	  for	  Workers,”	  International	  Trade	  
Union	  Confederation,	  June	  10,	  2015,	  http://www.ituc-­‐csi.org/ituc-­‐global-­‐rights-­‐index-­‐names.	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told	   him,	   “that	   murdering	   a	   trade	   unionist	   doesn’t	   violate	   these	   standards,	   that	  perpetuating	  violence	  against	  a	  trade	  unionist	  doesn’t	  violate	  these	  agreements.”132	  The	  right	  to	  freely	  join	  a	  union	  cannot	  be	  respected	  when	  labor	  organizers	  and	  trade	  union	  workers	  are	  routinely	  murdered	  in	  the	  trading	  partner	  country.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  US	  does	  not	  recognize	  this	  basic	  principle	  reflects	  the	  lack	  of	  seriousness	  the	  US	  applies	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  these	  labor	  provisions.	  	   While	   the	  US	  has	   been	   an	   advocate	   for	   the	   inclusion	  of	   labor	  provisions	   in	  trade	   agreements,	   and	   has	   professed	   its	   intention	   to	   draft	   provisions	   that	   are	  enforceable,	   it	   has	   largely	   failed	   to	   ensure	   implementation	   of	   these	   provisions	   in	  trading	   partner	   countries. 133 	  Efforts	   to	   promote	   labor	   rights	   are	   no	   longer	   a	  development	  choice	  to	  be	  made	  out	  of	  goodness,	  rather	  trade	  agreements	  now	  mean	  that	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  protect,	  respect	  fulfill	  labor	  rights.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  US	  and	   trading	   partner	   countries	   have	   no	   real	   obligation	   or	   incentive	   to	  monitor	   or	  enforce	   the	   implementation	  of	   labor	  provisions.	   Instead,	   the	   enforcement	  of	   labor	  provisions	   in	   trade	   agreements	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   political	   will	   of	   state	  governments.134	  As	  such,	  while	  the	  inclusion	  of	  labor	  provisions	  may	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  positive	  step,	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  standards	  are	  not	  enforced	  means	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  workers	  are	  often	  violated	  without	  recourse.	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  Michael	  McAuliff,	  “AFL-­‐CIO’s	  Trumka:	  USTR	  Told	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  Isn’t	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  Violation	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  Wells,	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  Journal	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  (April	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  357–513.	  134	  “The	  Trans-­‐Pacific	  Partnership:	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  Countries	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  Trade	  Law,”	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5.	  ACCOUNTABILITY	  AND	  THE	  GOVERNANCE	  GAP	  
	  	  A	  human	  rights	  based	  approach	  requires	  that	  involved	  actors	  are	  held	  accountable	  to	   the	   conduct	   and	   results	   of	   policies.	   Yet,	   the	   traditional	   statist	   model	   of	  accountability	  is	  no	  longer	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  the	  promotion	  of	  human	  rights.	  The	  gap	  in	  global	  governance	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  trade	  undermines	  the	  accountability	  of	  involved	  actors.	  Specifically,	  this	  section	  analyzes	  the	  governance	  gap	  and	  its	  effect	  on	  accountability	  in	  three	  realms:	  a)	  international	  institutions,	  b)	  the	  national	  level	  and	  c)	  business	  as	  a	  relevant	  actor.	  	   Human	   rights	   treaties	   do	  more	   than	   define	   norms	   and	   standards,	   they	   are	  legal	  instruments	  that	  states	  are	  obligated	  to	  uphold.	  The	  governance	  gap	  becomes	  glaringly	   apparent	   when	   discussing	   the	   weakness	   of	   the	   global,	   national	   and	  corporate	   accountability	   mechanisms	   of	   transnational	   policies.	   While	   trade	   is	  inherently	   transnational,	   no	   multilateral	   actor	   currently	   monitors	   states	   in	   their	  obligations	   to	   enforce	   labor	   rights	   in	   trade	   agreements.	   Meanwhile,	   business	   has	  been	   a	   major	   contributor	   to	   growing	   inequality, 135 	  and	   yet	   the	   international	  community	   lacks	   a	   monitoring	   system	   to	   ensure	   their	   responsibility	   to	   operate	  business	   ethically.	   This	   leaves	   states	  with	   no	   system	   of	   international	   oversight	   to	  ensure	   that	   trade	   agreements	   respect,	   protect	   and	   fulfill	   rights	   obligations.	   The	  combination	   of	   these	   factors	   leaves	   workers	   without	   an	   effective	   accountability	  mechanism.	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5.1	  International	  Institutions	  and	  the	  Gap	  in	  Global	  Governance	  The	   WTO	   has	   been	   explicit	   in	   claiming	   that	   its	   mandate	   does	   not	   include	   labor	  provisions	   in	   trade	   agreements.	   Instead,	   the	   WTO	   points	   to	   the	   ILO	   as	   the	  organization	  expected	  to	  address	  these	  issues.	  However,	  the	  ILO	  claims	  its	  mandate	  is	  limited	  to	  issuing	  general	  recommendations	  and	  responding	  when	  approached	  by	  specific	   states.	   As	   such,	   there	   exists	   a	   gap	   in	   global	   governance,	   namely	   that	   no	  international	   organization	   exists	   to	   ensure	   that	   labor	   rights	   are	   promoted	   in	   a	  realizable	   fashion	   in	   trade	   agreements.	   The	   ILO	   has	   been	   successful	   in	   fostering	  effective	   labor	   provisions	   when	   asked,	   indicating	   that	   expansion	   of	   the	  organization’s	  mandate	  could	  help	  close	  the	  gap	  in	  global	  governance.	  	  	   The	   relevant	   multilateral	   agencies,	   WTO	   and	   ILO,	   both	   have	   unique	  associations	  with	  the	  United	  Nations	  system.	  While	  both	  coordinate	  with	  the	  UN,	  the	  WTO	  is	  not	  a	  UN	  agency	  and	  the	  ILO	  predates	  the	  UN	  and	  is	  thus	  not	  established	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  of	  other	  UN	  programs	  or	  funds.136	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  founded	  on	  their	  own	  mandates,	  and	  both	  the	  WTO	  and	  ILO	  operate	  with	  more	  autonomy	  than	  other	  UN	  bodies.	  	   As	  mentioned	  previously,	  the	  WTO	  is	  the	  global	  institution	  that	  sets	  the	  rules	  of	   international	   trade.	   It	  would	   therefore	   seem	   that	   the	  organization	  might	  play	   a	  role	   in	   the	   discussion	   on	   the	   social	   impact	   of	   trade.	   However,	   the	  WTO	   offers	   no	  protections	  for	  labor	  rights.	  In	  fact,	  the	  WTO	  barred	  any	  justification	  for	  using	  labor	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violations	   as	   a	   motive	   for	   interfering	   with	   trade	   law.137	  The	   WTO’s	   refusal	   to	  incorporate	   labor	   rights	   into	   its	   framework	   is	   a	   prime	   example	   of	   how	   economic	  institutions	  have	  failed	  to	  incorporate	  the	  intersection	  of	  trade	  and	  human	  rights.	  	   The	  WTO’s	  official	   statement	  on	   the	   integration	  of	   labor	  standards	   in	   trade	  can	  be	  found	  in	  their	  1996	  Singapore	  Ministerial	  Declaration,	  which	  states	  that	  the	  WTO	   is	   committed	   to	   “the	   observance	   of	   internationally	   recognized	   core	   labour	  standards.”138	  The	  statement	  continues	  that	  the	  WTO	  as	  an	  organization	  	  “believe[s]	  that	   economic	   growth	   and	   development	   fostered	   by	   increased	   trade	   and	   further	  trade	   liberalization	   contribute	   to	   the	   promotion	   of	   these	   standards.”139	  Hence,	   the	  WTO	   recognizes	   that	   trade	   impacts	   growth	   and	   development,	   and	   promotes	   the	  core	   labor	   standards.	   If	   it	   recognizes	   the	  positive	   impact	   of	   trade,	   then	  by	   logic	   it	  must	   also	   recognize	   the	   intersection	   has	   potential	   for	   negative	   impact,	   such	   as	  increasing	   inequality	   in	   spite	  of	   growth,	   and	  placing	  downward	  pressure	  on	   labor	  standards.	  	  	   Nevertheless,	  the	  WTO’s	  commitment	  to	  rights	  is	  constrained	  by	  subsequent	  text	   from	  the	  Ministerial	  Declaration.	  The	  document	  states	  that	  the	  WTO	  “reject[s]	  the	   use	   of	   labour	   standards	   for	   protectionist	   purposes,	   and	   agree[s]	   that	   the	  comparative	   advantage	   of	   countries,	   particularly	   low-­‐wage	   developing	   countries,	  must	  in	  no	  way	  be	  put	  into	  question.”140	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  pledging	  itself	  to	  core	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  Labor	  Rights	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Davis	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  (2003):	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  Trade	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  Declaration.	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  Ibid.	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labor	  standards,	  the	  WTO	  undermines	  its	  commitment	  by	  prioritizing	  trade	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  economic	  development.	  	  	   As	  such,	  attempts	  to	  link	  labor	  to	  trade	  policy	  have	  been	  unsuccessful	  within	  the	   economic	   institution	   that	   represents	   the	   ultimate	   authority	   on	   trade.	   As	   the	  WTO	   considers	   labor	   outside	   its	   domain,	   this	   major	   player	   within	   the	   global	  economic	   arena	   disregards	   the	   incorporation	   of	   human	   rights	   as	   a	   significant	  element	  of	  trade.141	  	  	   The	  Ministerial	  Declaration	  goes	  on	  to	  place	  responsibility	  of	  trade’s	  impact	  on	   labor	   standards	   on	   the	   International	   Labor	   Organization	   (ILO).142	  The	   ILO,	   a	  normative	  body	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  protect	  labor	  standards,	  recognizes	  a	  significant	  relationship	  between	   labor	   and	   trade.143	  As	   such,	   one	  might	  presume	   that	   the	   ILO	  would	  be	  enthusiastically	  engaged	  on	  this	  issue.	  	  	   However,	   engagement	  by	   ILO	  on	  matters	   related	   to	   the	  promotion	  of	   labor	  rights	  via	   trade	  agreements	  has	   remained	   limited.	   In	  2008,	   the	   ILO	  Declaration	  on	  
Social	   Justice	   for	   a	   Fair	   Globalization	   clarified	   that	   the	   agenda	   of	   the	   ILO	   would	  remain	   within	   its	   constitutional	   mandate	   of	   supporting	   member	   states	  voluntarily.144	  The	   ILO	   has	   no	   explicit	   mandate	   to	   regulate	   member	   states	   trade	  agreements	   and	   has	   not	   taken	   an	   official	   position	   on	   the	   usefulness	   of	   labor	  provisions	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  enforcing	  labor	  rights.145	  The	  organization	  fears	  that	  taking	  a	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position	  could	  undermine	  the	  normative	  framework	  that	  the	  ILO	  has	  operated	  upon	  since	   its	   inception,	   namely	   the	   relevant	   strength	   of	   using	   conventions	   and	  recommendations	   to	   change	   norms.146	  Hence,	   the	   ILO	   insists	   that	   its	   mandate	   is	  limited	   to	  clarifying	  and	  recommending	   labor	  standards,	  only	   intervening	   in	   trade	  agreements	  when	  asked.	  	  	   Nevertheless,	   the	   organization	   does	   publish	   generalized	   reports	   about	   the	  effect	   of	   trade	   policies	   on	   labor	   rights.	   One	   such	   report	   found	   that	   “[r]espect	   for	  labour	   rights,	   whether	   through	   free	   trade	   agreements,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   regional	  integration	  or	   at	   a	  more	   global	   level,	   can	  make	   a	   significant	   contribution	   to	   a	   fair	  globalization	  in	  which	  economic	  development	  and	  social	  justice	  may	  progress	  hand	  in	   hand.”147	  While	   such	   generalized	   recommendations	   relate	   to	   the	   intersection	  of	  trade	  and	  labor,	  the	  ILO	  does	  not	  fully	  engage	  this	  issue	  as	  part	  of	  its	  mandate.	  	   Further,	   while	   it	   is	   not	   standard	   practice	   for	   the	   ILO	   to	   participate	   in	   an	  official	   capacity	   in	   trade	   agreements,	   the	   US	   has	   commonly	   reviewed	   ILO	   labor	  evaluations	   to	   assess	   the	   labor	   law	   of	   trading	   partners	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   ILO	  international	   labor	   standards.148	  The	   US	   then	  makes	   recommendations	   to	   trading	  partners	   on	   how	   to	   amend	   or	   adopt	   strengthened	   labor	   laws	   ahead	   of	   signing	   a	  trade	   agreement.149	  Regardless	   of	   this	   practice,	   ILO	   engagement	   in	   such	   matters	  remains	  limited.	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   When	   the	   ILO	   is	   approached	   by	   states,	   the	   organization	   is	   willing	   to	   be	  involved	  in	  trade	  agreements.	  For	  example,	  the	  US	  has	  sought	  out	  and	  engaged	  the	  ILO	  with	   the	  US-­‐Cambodia	  Textile	  Agreement	   in	  1999.	  The	   ILO	  was	   invited	  by	   the	  US	  and	  Cambodian	  Governments	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  role	  of	  monitoring.150	  Among	  the	  US	  trade	  agreements,	  the	  US-­‐Cambodia	  agreement	  has	  been	  heralded	  as	  a	  model	  agreement,	  “…where	  there	  have	  been	  significant	  and	  widespread	  improvements	   in	  wages,	  working	  conditions	  and	  respect	   for	  workers'	   rights.”151	  By	  being	  present	  at	  the	   trade	   negotiations,	   the	   ILO	   was	   able	   to	   facilitate	   the	   addition	   of	   economic	  incentives	  for	  the	  successful	  implementation	  of	  labor	  provisions.	  	   In	  response	   to	   the	  success	   from	  the	  US-­‐Cambodia	   trade	  agreement,	   the	   ILO	  initiated	   a	   monitoring	   program,	   named	   ‘Better	   Work,’	   that	   operates	   in	   eight	  countries.	  However,	  the	  ‘Better	  Work’	  program	  is	  not	  linked	  to	  trade	  agreements	  in	  all	   its	   programs.152	  While	   this	   ILO	   activity	   shows	   that	   the	   organization	   can	   be	  successful	  at	  monitoring	  labor	  rights	  on	  the	  ground,	  unfortunately,	  the	  ILO	  has	  not	  leveraged	   this	   success	   to	   take	   on	   a	   more	   prominent	   stance	   when	   it	   comes	   to	  enforcing	  labor	  provisions	  in	  trade	  agreements.	  	  	  
5.2	  Accountability	  at	  the	  National	  Level	  Without	   a	   multilateral	   agency	   holding	   government	   accountable	   in	   trade	   policies,	  states	   are	   left	   to	   implement	   labor	   provisions	   without	   consistent	   international	  oversight.	  And	  as	  was	  noted	  above,	  the	  statist	  model	  limits	  the	  duty	  to	  enforce	  labor	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rights	   within	   the	   domestic	   context.	   Moreover,	   the	   statist	   dynamic	   is	   no	   longer	  sufficient	  in	  an	  age	  of	  transnational	  trade	  policies.	  	  	   While	   human	   rights	   are	   universal	   in	   nature,	   and	   conventions	   are	  international,	   they	   are	   implemented	   domestically.	   State	   commitments	   are	  commonly	  explained	  by	  states	  duties	  to	  respect,	  protect	  and	  fulfill	  rights	  obligations.	  Beyond	   respecting	   rights	   in	  principle,	   states	  must	  ensure	  policies	  do	  not	   interfere	  with	   rights	   obligations,	   states	  must	   actively	   protect	   against	   third	   party	   violations	  and	   finally	   states	  must	   take	   action	   to	   secure	   rights	  where	   they	  have	  not	   yet	   been	  realized.153	  	  	   This	   shows	   clear	   levels	   of	   accountability:	   states	   are	   the	   duty	   bearers	   and	  individuals	   are	   rights	   holders.	   Thus,	   rights	   holders	   can	   hold	   states	   accountable,	  often	  via	  a	  legal	  mechanism	  by	  which	  to	  claim	  rights	  violations	  and	  seek	  redress.	  But	  while	  this	  obligation	  applies	  to	  all	  rights	  holders,	  regardless	  of	  their	  nationality	  and	  location,	   state	   obligations	   have	   traditionally	   been	   duties	   to	   respect,	   protect	   and	  fulfill	  the	  rights	  only	  of	  their	  citizens.	  	   This	   raises	  a	  weakness	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  holding	   states	  accountable.	  While	  there	  may	  be	  clear	  obligations,	  there	  exists	  an	  inherent	  paradox	  in	  the	  framework	  as	  it	   is	   heavily	  protectionist	   of	   state	   sovereignty.	   Freeman	  describes	   the	   relationship	  between	   duty	   bearers	   and	   rights	   holders	   as	   a	   “traditional	   statist	   model”	   that	   is	  inadequate	   for	   the	   “complex	   global	   system.” 154 	  Considering	   the	   impacts	   of	  transnational	   policies	   on	   human	   rights,	   how	   might	   states	   be	   obligated	   to	   ensure	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human	   rights	   transnationally?	   For	   example,	   the	   US	   involvement	   in	   trade	   policies	  impacts	  a	  trading	  partner’s	  available	  resources	  for	  development	  and	  improvements	  to	  human	  rights,	  as	  well	  as	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  an	  individuals’	  access	  to	  economic	  and	  material	  resources.155	  Is	   the	  US	  therefore	  accountable	  to	  the	  human	  rights	   impacts	  of	   laborers	   in	   trading	   partner	   states?	   While	   there	   are	   varying	   approaches	   to	  answering	  this	  question,	  Skogly	  and	  Gibney	  define	  transnational	  duties	  of	  states	  as	  “…obligations	  relating	  to	  the	  human	  rights	  effects	  of	  their	  external	  activities,	  such	  as	  trade,	   development	   cooperation,	   participation	   in	   international	   organizations,	   and	  security	   activities.”156	  Such	   analysis	   seems	   to	   apply	   international	   obligations	   onto	  states,	  where	   individuals	   regardless	   of	   citizenship	   can	   hold	   states	   accountable	   for	  rights	  violations.	  	   This	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   discussion	   on	   international	   trade,	   as	   the	  relationship	  is	  of	  an	  international	  nature	  and	  thus	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  states	  are	  not	   as	   clearly	  defined.	  The	  US	  enters	   into	   trade	  agreements	  with	   trading	  partners	  and	  those	  policies	  impact	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  laborers.	  	  Under	  the	  traditional	  model,	  the	  US	  would	  be	  obligated	  only	  to	  the	  labor	  rights	  within	  its	  domestic	  realm.	  Under	  a	  globalized	  model	  that	  recognizes	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  transnational	  policies,	  the	  US	  obligations	  would	  recognize	  the	  international	   impact	  of	  its	  trade	  policies	  on	  human	  rights	  of	  foreign	  workers	  as	  well.	  Nevertheless,	  states	  refrain	  from	  transnational	  obligations,	  considering	  human	  rights	  of	  foreigners	  to	  be	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matters	  outside	  their	  obligatory	  domain,	  justified	  out	  of	  respect	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereignty.157	  	   This	   leads	   the	  discussion	  back	   to	  global	  governance.	   It	  has	  been	   found	   that	  denationalization	   is	  often	   complemented	  with	  an	   increase	   in	  global	   institutions	   to	  fill	  a	  governance	  gap.158	  Yet,	  as	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  sub-­‐section,	  international	  institutions	   have	   not	   accepted	   the	   intersection	   of	   trade	   and	   labor	   as	   part	   of	   their	  mandates.	   Without	   global	   structures	   to	   provide	   accountability,	   and	   without	   the	  willingness	   of	   states	   to	   be	   held	   accountable	   to	   rights	   holders	   outside	   their	  jurisdictions,	   those	   responsible	   for	   violations	   of	   the	   labor	   provisions	   in	   trade	  agreements	  may	  not	  be	  held	  accountable.	  	  	  	   Alongside	   these	   actors,	   business	   has	   emerged	   as	   increasingly	   influential	   in	  their	   role	   as	   violators	   of	   labor	   standards.	   The	   next	   section	   discusses	   the	   lack	   of	  accepted	   mechanisms	   to	   hold	   business	   accountable	   for	   the	   violations	   of	   labor	  standards.	  	  
5.3	  Business	  and	  the	  Lack	  of	  Accountability	  	  While	   the	   impact	   of	   business	  practices	   on	  human	   rights	  has	  been	   incorporated	   in	  the	  discourse	  since	  the	  1970’s,	   there	   is	  no	  accepted	  global	  governance	  mechanism	  that	  currently	  regulates	  international	  business.159	  Efforts	  to	  create	  an	  accountability	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  Michael	  Zürn,	  “Globalization	  and	  Global	  Governance:	  From	  Societal	  to	  Political	  Denationalization,”	  
European	  Review	  11,	  no.	  3	  (July	  1,	  2003):	  341.	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  Freeman,	  Human	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  2002.	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structure	  for	  business	  operations	  have	  mostly	  been	  voluntary	  frameworks,	  not	  legal	  infrastructures.160	  	   The	  Norms	   on	   Transnational	   Corporations	   and	  Other	   Business	   Enterprises	  (the	  Norms)	  represents	  one	  of	  the	  only	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	  binding	  accountability	  mechanism	  for	  business.	  This	  effort,	  which	  took	  place	  between	  1999	  and	  2003,	  was	  an	   attempt	   to	   promote	   corresponding	   legal	   duties	   to	   business	   practices. 161	  Unsurprisingly,	   the	   Norms	   were	   intensely	   debated	   and	   did	   not	   garner	   much	  support.162	  	  	   However,	  the	  need	  for	  standardized	  guidance	  became	  apparent	  and	  resulted	  in	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  UN	  Special	  Representative	  of	  the	  Secretary	  General	  (SRSG)	  in	   2008. 163 	  In	   2011,	   then	   Special	   Representative	   John	   Ruggie	   developed	  authoritative	  guidelines	  for	  business	  and	  human	  rights.164	  He	  wrote	  that	  the	  “state-­‐based	   system	   of	   global	   governance	   has	   struggled	   for	   more	   than	   a	   generation	   to	  adjust	   to	   the	   expanding	   reach	   and	   growing	   influence	   of	   transnational	  corporation.”165	  The	   Ruggie	   framework,	   known	   as	   the	   UN	   Guiding	   Principles	   on	  Business	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (UNGPs),	  are	  an	  attempt	  to	  balance	  state	  obligations	  to	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protect	  human	  rights	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  business	  to	  respect	  rights	  abuses	  in	  their	  operations.166	  	  	   As	  a	  whole,	  the	  UNGPs	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  falling	  short	  in	  that	  they	  are	  not	   legally	   binding,	   are	   vague	   and	   fail	   to	   address	   governance	   gaps.167	  Specific	   to	  trade,	   the	   9th	   Principle	   of	   the	   UNGPs	   calls	   on	   governments	   to	   ensure	   that	   trade	  agreements	   do	   not	   constrain	   the	   obligations	   states	   accepted	   to	   ensure	   human	  rights.168	  In	   addition	   to	   being	   subjected	   to	   the	   same	   criticisms	   as	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  document,	  this	  Principle	  simply	  states	  that	  international	  legal	  obligations	  also	  apply	  to	  trade	  negotiations.	  As	  explained	  above,	  states,	  like	  the	  US,	  do	  reference	  standards	  from	   international	   legal	   documents	   when	   forming	   the	   labor	   provisions	   of	   trade	  agreements.	  However,	  as	  previously	  explained,	   this	   is	   far	   from	  ensuring	  that	   labor	  standards	   will	   be	   realized	   on	   the	   ground.	   Instead	   of	   attempting	   to	   improve	  enforcement	   of	   labor	   standards,	   this	   Principle	   merely	   states	   that	   governments	  should	  respect	  international	  obligations.	  	   As	   was	   referenced	   in	   the	   textual	   analysis	   of	   the	   TPP,	   corporate	   social	  responsibility	  is	  referenced	  in	  the	  main	  text	  of	  the	  labor	  chapter;	  however,	  business	  is	  merely	  encouraged	  to	  adopt	  voluntary	  initiatives.	  Further,	  as	  was	  discussed	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  the	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section	  on	  participation,	  business	  is	  overrepresented	  at	  the	  negotiating	  table	  of	  US	  trade	   agreements.	   As	   such,	   the	   interests	   and	   voice	   of	   business	   is	   influential	   in	  shaping	  the	  trade	  policies,	  and	  yet,	  business	  is	  not	  accountable	  to	  the	  outcomes.	  	  	   While	   the	  UNGPs	  are	  a	   step	   forward	   in	  bringing	  business	   into	   the	   realm	  of	  responsible	   parties,	   they	   do	   not	   go	   far	   enough	   in	   ensuring	   that	   business	   is	   held	  accountable,	   especially	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   trade.	   In	   the	   global	   arena,	   the	   lack	   of	  international	  organization	  to	  comprehensively	  address	  the	  intersection	  of	  trade	  and	  labor	   leads	   to	   a	   gap	   in	   governance.	   The	   inherently	   transnational	   nature	   of	   trade	  agreements	   makes	   the	   statist	   model	   outdated.	   Without	   significant	   changes	   to	  accountability	   mechanisms	   at	   the	   national	   level,	   states	   will	   continue	   to	   be	  accountable	  only	   to	   their	   citizens.	  Given	   this	   analysis,	  workers	   are	   left	  without	   an	  appropriate	  system	  to	  hold	  actors	  accountable	  for	  violations	  of	   labor	  provisions	  in	  trade	  agreements.	  
	  
6.	  CONCLUSION	  
	  The	   unequal	   participation	   of	   states,	   business	   and	   labor	   in	   the	   negotiations	   of	   US	  trade	   agreements	   results	   in	   ineffective	   labor	   provisions.	   This	   is	   evident	   in	   the	  textual	   modifications	   to	   labor	   chapters	   in	   trade	   agreements,	   as	   well	   as	   the	  implementation	   of	   labor	   provisions	   through	   legal	   and	   institutional	   reform,	   which	  did	   not	   always	   result	   in	   the	   enhancement	   of	   labor	   rights.	   Moreover,	   a	   gap	   in	  governance	   left	   workers	   without	   effective	   accountability	   mechanisms	   at	   multiple	  levels.	  	  	   The	  application	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  based	  approach	  applied	  to	  trade	  policies	  is	  unique,	  with	   both	   academic	   and	   practical	   implications.	   Utilizing	   a	   HRBA	   provides	  
	   58	  
new	   perspectives	   and	   dimensions	   for	   future	   research	   on	   trade	   and	   economic	  policies.	  It	  incorporates	  human	  rights	  into	  the	  economic	  discourse	  in	  a	  structurally	  significant	  way,	   including	   a	   broader	   assessment	   of	   cause	   and	   impact.	   In	   terms	   of	  practice,	  the	  operationalization	  of	  a	  HRBA	  matters	  in	  the	  lives	  of	  workers.	  Such	  an	  approach	   reflects	   their	   important	   contributions	   and	   consensus,	   resulting	   in	  better	  policies	   with	   tangible	   impacts.	   Trade	   policies	   should	   be	   designed	   to	   enhance	   the	  realization	  of	  human	  rights	  of	  all	  stakeholders,	  and	  a	  HRBA	  is	  a	  contribution	  to	  that	  objective.	  	   As	   one	   of	   the	   core	   principles	   of	   the	   HRBA,	   this	   thesis	   contributed	   to	   the	  discussion	  of	  participation.	  While	  the	  limited	  participation	  of	  labor	  in	  comparison	  to	  actors	   like	   governments	   and	   business	   has	   been	   recognized,	   this	   thesis	   links	   this	  relative	   lack	   of	   participation	   to	   ineffective	   labor	   provisions.	   Without	   the	   equal	  inclusion	  of	  labor	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  negotiating	  process,	  labor	  standards	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  realized	  on	  the	  ground.	  Further,	  this	  thesis	  promotes	  inclusion	  of	  the	  workers	  of	  US	  trading	  partners	  as	  integral	  to	  the	  process.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  participation,	  this	  thesis	  also	  looked	  at	  how	  the	  intersection	  of	  trade	  and	  labor	  relates	  to	  equitable	  development.	  While	  trade	  has	  often	  been	  linked	  to	   economic	   growth	   and	   thus	   development,	   this	   thesis	   goes	   a	   step	   further	   by	  analyzing	   how	   trade	   exacerbates	   structural	   inequality	   both	   within	   and	   among	  states.	  	  	   While	   many	   researchers	   have	   analyzed	   the	   role	   of	   international	  organizations,	  the	  gap	  in	  mandates	  of	  both	  the	  WTO	  and	  the	  ILO	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  trade	  and	  labor	  is	  not	  explored	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  levels	  of	  governance.	  Connecting	  
	   59	  
this	  gap	  in	  global	  governance	  to	  ineffective	  labor	  provisions	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  adequate	  accountability	  mechanisms	  shows	  the	  very	  real	  effect	   this	  gap	  plays	   in	   the	   lives	  of	  workers.	  	  	   There	   are	   several	   areas	   of	   additional	   research	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   further	  advance	  the	  themes	  in	  this	  thesis.	  First,	   future	  research	  could	  apply	  a	  HRBA	  to	  the	  entirety	  of	  trade	  agreements,	  well	  beyond	  labor	  provisions.	  Second,	  while	  the	  TPP	  is	  in	  its	  final	  stages,	  practitioners	  can	  still	  use	  a	  HRBA	  to	  evaluate	  its	  various	  chapters	  and	   intended	   effects	   on	  workers.	   The	   impending	   approval	   and	   implementation	   of	  the	  TPP	  will	  present	  opportunities	  for	  researchers	  to	  continue	  exploring	  the	  relative	  effectiveness	  of	   labor	  provisions.	  Third,	  while	   the	  principle	  of	  participation	   is	  well	  established,	  additional	  work	  could	  focus	  on	  potential	  incentives	  for	  both	  states	  and	  business	   to	   better	   and	  more	   equally	   incorporate	   labor	   in	   trade	   negotiations.	   And	  last,	   future	  research	  could	  explore	  potential	  alternative	  platforms	  aimed	  at	  closing	  the	  governance	  gap	  at	  the	  international	  level.	  Specifically,	  such	  work	  could	  focus	  on	  needed	  reforms	  of	  international	  organizations	  to	  ensure	  that	  human	  rights	  issues	  as	  a	  function	  of	  trade	  are	  continuously	  being	  advanced.	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